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INTRODUCTION 
n June 30, 2009, the representatives of forty-six states met in Te-
rezín, the infamous ghetto where thousands of European Jews and 
other victims of Nazi persecution perished during World War II 
(“WWII”). The meeting was the finale of the four-day Prague Holocaust 
Era Assets Conference during which political leaders, experts and non-
governmental organization (“NGO”) representatives had gathered to dis-
cuss Holocaust-related issues, among them the restitution of Nazi era1 
confiscated art, Judaica, and Jewish cultural property.2 Thus was born the 
Terezín Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues, the lat-
est link in a decade-long chain of the international community’s response 
to the enduring injustices of Nazi spoliation.3 
However, in spite of numerous international declarations proclaiming 
moral obligations for governments to effectuate the return of Nazi-looted 
art and cultural property to Holocaust victims and their heirs, United 
States courts have shown little difficulty dismissing these important in-
ternational commitments by denying numerous claims for recovery. 
On August 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana which awarded title of a Kokoschka painting, Portrait of a 
                                                                                                             
 1. The term “Nazi era” refers to the period of the Nazi reign (1933–1945) and thus 
covers a wider time period than the mere war years, 1939–1945. Hence, “Nazi era looted 
art” refers to art objects that were stolen or otherwise seized from their owners between 
the moment of Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 and the fall of the regime in 1945. See 
KATJA LUBINA, CONTESTED CULTURAL PROPERTY: THE RETURN OF NAZI SPOLIATED ART 
AND HUMAN REMAINS FROM PUBLIC COLLECTIONS 41–42 (2009). However, it is notewor-
thy that for works created prior to 1933, Sotheby’s requires full provenance information 
from 1933 to 1948. See generally LUCIAN J. SIMMONS, Provenance and Auction Houses, 
in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 85 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration ed., 2004) [hereinafter RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
DISPUTES]. By extension, the American Association of Museums (“AAM”) considers 
1951, with the closing of the Munich Central Collecting Point, as the final year. NANCY 
H. YEIDE ET AL., THE AAM GUIDE TO PROVENANCE RESEARCH 41 (2001). 
 2. For general information regarding the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference, 
the Terezín Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues, and all conference 
proceedings, see HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONF., http://www.holocausteraassets.eu (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2011) (Czech). 
 3. The term “Nazi spoliation” refers to the program of systematic plunder of private 
and public property (often artwork) by agents acting on behalf of the Third Reich in terri-
tories that came under Nazi occupation. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 42. However, the 
notion is not restricted to confiscations and plunder, but also includes other involuntary 
losses that are considered as being precipitated by the Nazi Regime, such as sales of art-
work in exchange for export visa. Id. 
O
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Youth, to its current possessor.4 The court found against the sole heir of a 
Holocaust victim who argued, to no avail, that the Terezín Declaration 
preempted Louisiana’s law on prescriptive limitation.5 
Similarly, on December 16, 2010, in spite of the Terezín Declaration’s 
goal to resolve Nazi era title disputes on the merits, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York that dismissed, on limitation grounds, 
a challenge to a New York museum’s ownership of three prized works 
by George Grosz.6 In that case, the late German artist’s heirs filed suit 
against the Museum of Modern Art (“MoMA”) seeking the return of 
artwork that fell prey to a network of unscrupulous dealers who took ad-
vantage of the Nazi regime’s disfavor with the artist to divest him of his 
ownership.7 
These examples render palpable the equivocality surrounding the ad-
ministration of justice in the field of Nazi era art disputes. This Article 
exposes the tenuousness of public international law arguments in obtain-
ing restitution of looted artwork from U.S. museum collections. Accord-
ingly, the Article comments on the sharp divide between moral obliga-
tions and legal duties with regard to restitution matters. The Article’s 
analysis of the impact of the Terezín Declaration and its predecessors on 
the settlement of Holocaust-related title disputes is not limited to the 
United States; it will likewise touch upon the situation on the European 
continent, the battleground of Nazi spoliation and home to numerous 
world-class museums. In many European countries, the overt disregard 
for international political consensus on the moral decency of restitution is 
equally alive. However, certain Western European countries—such as 
France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands—
grant significantly better heed to fulfilling their commitments under the 
                                                                                                             
 4. Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 2010), aff’g 638 F. 
Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. La. 2009). 
 5. Id. at 575–76; see Martha Lufkin, Louisiana Court Affirms Rightful Owner in 
Kokoschka Claim, ART NEWSPAPER (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://theartnewspaper.com/articles/Louisiana-court-affirms-rightful-owner-in-
Kokoschka-claim/21335. 
 6. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 403 Fed. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 7. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), reconsideration denied by, motion denied by, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20248 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d 403 Fed. App’x. 575 (2d Cir. 2010); see generally Javier Pes, 
Grosz Heirs vs. MoMA Case Dismissed: Three-Year Statute of Limitations Has Run Out, 
ART NEWSPAPER (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Grosz-heirs-
vs-MoMA-case-dismissed/20127. 
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international art restitution agreements.8 Accordingly, these countries’ 
compliance with the international framework provides interesting insight 
to the contrasting approaches adopted in key jurisdictions on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
However, the main purpose of this Article does not lie at a merely 
comparative level. First, despite contrary claims in international fora, 
American inertia towards art restitution is increasingly evident from lack 
of domestic implementation of international commitments. Second, de-
spite the widespread and readily invoked public international law argu-
ments in Nazi era art litigation, this Article shows that, for most signato-
ry countries, their added value to legal proceedings seeking restitution of 
looted art is virtually nonexistent. Consequently, there is—at least from a 
legal point of view—no need for additional declarations regarding Nazi 
era art looting. The only way for the international community to achieve 
the spirit of the principles established in the Washington Conference 
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (the “Washington Principles”)9 is to 
broadly implement the existing framework, not to add another nonbind-
ing recital of good intentions. 
Part I of this Article briefly surveys the modern upsurge in Holocaust-
related title disputes and interprets the prominence of Nazi-looted art 
disputes over the past fifteen years as a result of the post-Cold War re-
vival of the general debate on wartime spoliations. Part II describes the 
international community’s response to the worldwide explosion of Nazi-
looted art claims that previously simmered under the surface of Cold 
War tensions. It also examines a chain of public law instruments that 
were adopted over the past thirteen years to come to terms with the en-
during injustices of Nazi art spoliation. Part III, posits that, from a legal 
point of view, the ambiguous objectives of these various international 
agreements have been met only fragmentarily, if at all, by the United 
States. This may be attributed to the U.S. courts’ reticence toward im-
plementation of such initiatives in domestic law and the private status of 
the leading American art museums. Part IV enlarges the Article’s geo-
graphical scope by calling attention to the heterogeneous implementation 
of the international agreements on the European continent. This analysis 
offers some comparative thoughts by contrasting the contemporary posi-
tion of the United States with the noncompliance of Eastern and South-
                                                                                                             
 8. See National Organizations Involved in Looted Cultural Property Restitution, 
CLAIMS CONF., http://www.claimscon.org/index.asp?url=artworks/national (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2011). 
 9. Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, princ. I, Dec. 3, 
1998 [hereinafter Washington Principles], available at 
http://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/resource/assets/princ.htm. 
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ern European countries, and also with the establishment of alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving ownership issues in certain 
Western European jurisdictions. 
I. MODERN UPSURGE IN HOLOCAUST-RELATED TITLE DISPUTES 
The international community’s willingness to address the outstanding 
injustices of WWII resulted from a remarkable upsurge in Holocaust-
related title disputes over the past fifteen years.10 The recent prominence 
of Nazi-looted art claims is a manifestation of the post-Cold War revival 
of the general debate on wartime spoliation.11 This may be attributed to a 
variety of causes, each of which enhanced the public’s awareness of the 
Nazi regime’s obsession with art looting and the availability of infor-
mation allowing for retrieval and restitution.12 
A. Revival of the General Debate on Wartime Spoliations 
The primary reason for the explosion in Holocaust-related claims13 in 
recent years is most likely the worldwide declassification of government 
records relating to WWII.14 These records were locked away in restricted 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra notes 78–140 and accompanying text. 
 11. LUBINA, supra note 1, at 160–62. 
 12. Id. at 161–62. 
 13. Cases regarding Nazi era art lootings are only one type of Holocaust-related dis-
putes recently brought before U.S. and European courts. For a thorough analysis of vari-
ous types of Holocaust-related disputes, see MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: 
THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 1–58, 63–66, 172–78 (2003) [here-
inafter BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE]; see, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in 
America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter Bazyler, Nuremberg in America]; see also Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Repa-
rations Litigation: Lessons for the Slavery Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 615 (2003); see also STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED 
ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2003) [herein-
after EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE]; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations 
for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003). For more on 
the issue of Holocaust-related dormant Swiss bank accounts, see infra notes 30–43 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. Nancy H. Yeide, Provenance and Museums, in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL 
PROPERTY DISPUTES, supra note 1, at 99; Howard N. Spiegler, Recovering Nazi-Looted 
Art: Report from the Front Lines, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 301 (2001); Stephanie Cuba, 
Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on Claims for Nazi-
Looted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 448–49 (1999); see also MICHAEL J. 
KURTZ, AMERICA AND THE RETURN OF NAZI CONTRABAND 210–11 (2006) [hereinafter 
KURTZ, AMERICA & NAZI CONTRABAND]; LUBINA, supra note 1, at 160. 
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access archives for more than fifty years,15 due to the lack of political 
support to confront the full extent of the Nazi era spoliations in the polar-
ized postwar world.16 Indeed, tensions during the Cold War years left 
little room for introspection into, or discussion about, Germany’s war-
time past.17 The willingness to declassify Nazi era documents in both the 
East and West—and to actually restitute looted artwork18—was only pos-
sible after the fall of the Iron Curtain.19 It is generally acknowledged that 
the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc 
played an important part in opening up the extensive Soviet archives on 
trophy art,20 which provided key evidence for a great deal of the current 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Nancy H. Yeide, Provenance and Museums, in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL 
PROPERTY DISPUTES, supra note 1, at 99; Paulina McCarter Collins, Comment, Has “The 
Lost Museum” Been Found? Declassification of Government Documents and Report on 
Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity to “Do Justice” for Holocaust Victims on the 
Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 119, 140–41 (2002) [hereinafter McCarter 
Collins]; Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call for a New Attitude Towards 
Artwork Stolen During World War II, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 28 (1998); Alex-
andra Minkovich, Note, The Successful Use of Laches in World War II-Era Art Theft 
Disputes: It’s Only a Matter of Time, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 351 (2004); Stephan J. 
Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim Fine Arts Litigation and 
a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87, 97 (1999); 
Leah Weiss, Note, The Role of Museums in Sustaining the Illicit Trade in Cultural Prop-
erty, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 837, 866–67 (2007). 
 16. Michele I. Turner, Note, The Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During WWII, 32 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1511, 1520 (1999). For a thorough analysis of restitution politics 
in the Cold War, see KURTZ, AMERICA & NAZI CONTRABAND, supra note 14, at 177–200. 
 17. PETER NOVICK, THE HOLOCAUST IN AMERICAN LIFE 86–102, 127–28 (1999); see 
Mikka Gee Conway, Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption and Von Saher v. Norton 
Simon Museum: Complicating the “Just and Fair Solution” to Holocaust-Era Art 
Claims, 28 LAW & INEQ. 373, 376 (2010). 
 18. Rebecca L. Garrett, Time for a Change? Restoring Nazi-Looted Artworks to its 
Rightful Owners, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 367, 371–72 (2000); see also Jessica Mullery, 
Note, Fulfilling the Washington Principles: A Proposal for Arbitration Panels to Resolve 
Holocaust-Era Art Claims, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 643, 648 (2010). 
 19. Conway, supra note 17, at 376; Spiegler, supra note 14, at 301; Alexis Derrossett, 
Note, The Final Solution: Making Title Insurance Mandatory for Art Sold in Auction 
Houses and Displayed in Museums That Is Likely to Be Holocaust Looted Art, 9 T.M. 
COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 223, 232–33 (2007); Kelly Ann Falconer, Comment, 
When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally Binding International Agreement 
Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 383, 386 n.16 
(2000). 
 20. This Article does not address the international law debate of whether the Sovi-
et/Russian notion of trophy art as compensation in kind for wartime losses is legal or 
morally justifiable. For materials discussing this issue in more detail, see generally Ste-
ven Costello, Must Russia Return the Artwork Stolen from Germany During World War 
II?, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141 (1997); S. Shawn Stephens, The Hermitage and 
Pushkin Exhibits: An Analysis of the Ownership Rights to Cultural Properties Removed 
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title disputes. Access to information regarding the fate and whereabouts 
of artwork traded during the Nazi era and the identities of wartime art 
dealers suddenly enabled many victims of Nazi spoliation to make 
claims.21 
In the early 1990s, scholars and journalists played an important role in 
the revival of the stolen art debate, as their writings facilitated public ac-
cess to declassified information.22 Indeed, scholarly research and journal-
istic interest resulted in an abundance of publications, which in turn in-
duced increasing popular awareness, about both the extent and the brutal-
ity of the Nazi art spoliation.23 In most countries, the inadequacies of the 
postwar restitution initiatives were also exposed.24 Soon, public aware-
ness triggered some highly publicized claims25 and motivated politicians 
                                                                                                             
from Occupied Germany, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 59 (1995); Victoria A. Birov, Note, Prize 
or Plunder?: The Pillage of Works of Art and the International Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 201 (1998); Margaret M. Mastroberardino, Comment, The Last Prisoners 
of World War II, 9 PACE INT’L L. REV. 315 (1997); Lina M. Montén, Note, Soviet World 
War II Trophy Art in Present Day Russia: The Events, the Law, and the Current Contro-
versies, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 37 (2004). 
 21. See Garrett, supra note 18, at 373; Turner, supra note 16, at 1539–41 (noting that 
lack of access to the archives prohibited victims of Nazi spoliation from accessing relief 
from the courts because the potential claimants could not meet the evidentiary burden of 
proving title). 
 22. Emily A. Graefe, Note, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing Nazi-
Looted Art, 51 B.C. L. REV. 473, 476 (2010); Minkovich, supra note 15, at 354; see also 
Spiegler, supra note 14, at 300. 
 23. For some milestone publications on the theme of Nazi spoliation, see generally 
KONSTANTIN AKINSHA & GRIGORII KOZLOV, BEAUTIFUL LOOT: THE SOVIET PLUNDER OF 
EUROPE’S ART TREASURES (1995); HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI 
CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (Tim Bent & Hector Feli-
ciano trans., 1997); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S 
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994); JONATHAN 
PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH (1996). In 1991, two former Soviet 
museum curators Konstantin Akinsha and Grigorii Kozlov had already set the art world 
ablaze with their ARTNEWS articles dealing with the touchy subject of Russian war treas-
ures. See Konstantin Akinsha & Grigorii Kozlov, Spoils of War: The Soviet Union’s Hid-
den Art Treasures, ARTNEWS, Apr. 1991, at 130; Konstantin Akinsha & Grigorii Kozlov, 
The Soviets’ War Treasures: A Growing Controversy, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1991, at 112. 
 24. David Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, A Picasso, & A Schiele: Recent Litigation At-
tempts to Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 39, 43 (2004). For 
some authoritative publications on the postwar restitution initiatives, see generally 
NORMAN PALMER, MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST: LAW PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
(2000); THE SPOILS OF WAR: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE LOSS, 
REAPPEARANCE, AND RECOVERY OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter THE SPOILS OF WAR]. 
 25. Crucial in building momentum for political action in the U.S. were the much de-
bated restitution cases regarding the Quedlinburg Treasure, Willi Korte, Search for the 
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Treasures, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 24, at 150–51, and the Degas painting, 
entitled Landscape with Smokestacks. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 
215–21. 
  In the case of the Quedlinburg Treasure, the authorities of the German church of 
Quedlinburg sued the heirs of a U.S. serviceman, Joe Meador. Thomas R. Kline, Legal 
Issues Relating to the Recovery of the Quedlinburg Treasures, in THE SPOILS OF WAR, 
supra note 24, at 156; see, e.g., Stiftskirche-Domgemeinde of Quedlinburg v. Meador, 
No. CA3-90-1440-D (N.D. Tex. June 18, 1990). At the end of WWII, while stationed at 
Quedlinburg, Meador stole priceless medieval artifacts that the church had hidden for 
safekeeping in a cave on the outskirts of the town. William H. Honan, Abrupt End to a 
Case of Looted Treasures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1996, at C13 [hereinafter Honan, Abrupt 
End]. After the war, the church reported the objects missing. See Korte, supra, at 151. 
Unfortunately, they could not be found. See id. Upon Meador’s death, the artifacts passed 
to his brother and sister. Id. at 150. It was not until Meador’s heirs attempted to sell the 
artifacts in the late 1980s their theft came to light. Id. at 151; Kline, supra, at 156–57. A 
demand for restitution was not long in coming. Kline, supra, at 156–57. When negotia-
tions broke down, the church filed an action in replevin against the Meador heirs. Id. The 
parties reached an out-of-court settlement in 1992. Honan, Abrupt End, supra. The heirs 
agreed to return all artifacts in exchange for $2.75 million. Id. However, in addition to the 
civil claim for restitution, the Quedlinburg dispute is equally interesting for its subse-
quent criminal and tax proceedings. Id. After the 1992 settlement, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office filed suit for conspiracy to sell stolen property. Id. The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas dismissed the case, as the action was time-barred. Id. The Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. See United States v. 
Meador, No. 4:96cr1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22058, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 1996), 
aff’d, 138 F.3d 986 (5th Cir. 1998). Following the dismissal of criminal charges, the In-
ternal Revenue Service launched an inquiry against the Meador heirs for tax evasion. 
William H. Honan, Quiet Conclusion for Case of Art Stolen During War, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2000, at B10. On April 20, 2000, the heirs reached a settlement to pay $135,000 
in back taxes, penalties and interest. Id. The Quedlinburg case was broadly commentated 
on by legal scholars and covered in the media, see, for example, Hans Kennon, Take a 
Picture, It May Last Longer if Guggenheim Becomes the Law of the Land: The Repatria-
tion of Fine Art, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 373, 376–78 (1996); Ruth Redmond-Cooper, 
Quedlinburg Indictment Comes Too Late, 3 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 307 (1998) (U.K.); Kurt 
Siehr, Manuscript of the Quedlinburg Cathedral back in Germany, 1 INT. J. CULT. PROP. 
215 (1992) (U.K.); Claudia Fox, Comment, The Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Ille-
gally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in 
Cultural Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 227–29 (1993); William H. Honan, 
It’s Finally Agreed: Germany to Regain A Stolen Trove, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at 
C15; William H. Honan, New Demand Delays Quedlinburg Treasures Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 1990, at C24. 
  Goodman & Gutmann v. Searle was a high-profile dispute over the ownership of 
a Degas painting that, prior to the war, belonged to the German Gutmann family. 
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 216. In 1939, Friedrich and Louise 
Gutmann sent the Degas pastel, along with others paintings, to Paris for safekeeping. Id. 
However, during the occupation of France, the Nazis managed to confiscate the painting. 
See id. In 1996, the Gutmann heirs filed suit in a New York federal court, but soon the 
case was transferred to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See id. at 
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and congressional endeavors worldwide.26 The reemergence of the public 
debate on Nazi era spoliation resulted in a series of research commis-
sions and international conferences. These gatherings delivered compre-
hensive reports and led to the proclamation of principles and resolu-
tions.27 Many of these initiatives did not exclusively address looted art, 
but took a more general approach by focusing on all kinds of wartime-
plundered assets.28 
In 1995, the World Jewish Congress broached the delicate subject of 
dormant Swiss bank accounts, to which victims of Nazi persecution dur-
ing and prior to WWII had made deposits for safekeeping.29 The heirs of 
Holocaust survivors encountered difficulties in accessing the accounts of 
their deceased relatives, often due to deliberate delaying tactics on the 
part of the Swiss financial institutions.30 Assisted by extensive media 
coverage, the World Jewish Congress helped mobilize several senior 
                                                                                                             
217. Eventually, the dispute was settled in a Solomon-like manner. Id. at 221. Daniel 
Searle, the current owner and good faith purchaser, ceded a 50% ownership interest to the 
Art Institute of Chicago and a 50% ownership interest to the Gutmann heirs, who, in turn, 
agreed to sell their part to the Art Institute. Id. The case was broadly covered in the press 
and commented on in countless law review articles. See, e.g., Hector Feliciano, The Af-
termath of Nazi Art Looting in the United States and Europe: The Quest to Recover Sto-
len Collections, 10 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 1 (1999); Rebecca Keim, Filling the Gap 
Between Morality and Jurisprudence: The Use of Binding Arbitration to Resolve Claims 
of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen Art, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 295, 304–05 (2003); 
Anne-Marie Rhodes, On Art Theft, Tax, and Time: Triangulating Ownership Disputes 
Through the Tax Code, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 504–06 (2006); Spiegler, supra note 
14, at 302–03; Turner, supra note 16, at 1528; Barbara J. Tyler, The Stolen Museum: 
Have United States Art Museums Become Inadvertent Fences for Stolen Art Works Loot-
ed By the Nazis in World War II?, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 441, 453–55 (1999); Stephen E. Weil, 
The American Legal Response to the Problem of Holocaust Art, 4 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 
285, 294–95 (1999) (U.K.); Geri J. Yonover, The “Last Prisoners of War”:Unrestituted 
Nazi-Looted Art, 6 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 81, 87–88 (2004); Judith H. Dobrzynski, 
Settlement in Dispute over a Painting Looted by Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at 
A17; see also HOWARD J. TRIENENS, LANDSCAPE WITH SMOKESTACKS: THE CASE OF THE 
ALLEGEDLY PLUNDERED DEGAS (2000). 
 26. See Falconer, supra note 19, at 399–404; Kelly D. Walton, Leave No Stone Un-
turned: The Search for Art Stolen by the Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution 
of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549, 605–07 (1999); Mullery, 
supra note 18, at 649–50. 
 27. McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 140–50. 
 28. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 163. 
 29. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 2, 12–13. 
 30. See generally BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 32; PHILIPPE 
BRAILLARD, SWITZERLAND AND THE CRISIS OF DORMANT ASSETS AND NAZI GOLD 13–14 
(2000); Cuba, supra note 14, at 463; Jodi Berlin Ganz, Note, Heirs without Assets and 
Assets without Heirs: Recovering and Reclaiming Dormant Swiss Bank Accounts, 20 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1306 (1997). 
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U.S. government officials, including Under Secretary of Commerce for 
International Trade, Stuart E. Eizenstat,31 and U.S. Senator Alfonse 
D’Amato.32 Mr. D’Amato then chaired the 1996 hearings of the Senate 
Banking Committee on Holocaust victim deposits in Swiss banks.33 The-
se proceedings caused substantial friction between Switzerland and the 
United States.34 In late 1996 and early 1997, a series of class action law-
suits against major Swiss banks were filed in New York.35 In April 1997, 
these actions were consolidated and retitled In re Holocaust Victim As-
sets Litigation.36 The class action eventually grew to include claims relat-
                                                                                                             
 31. In May 1997, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of Commerce for International 
Trade, Special Envoy of the Department of State on Property Restitution in Central and 
Eastern Europe, coordinated a study entitled U.S. and Allied Efforts To Recover and Re-
store Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II (pre-
pared by William Z. Slany), available at http://www.ushmm.org/assets/state/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
 32. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 13–14. 
 33. Id. at 21; see also In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. (Holocaust Victims Assets 
Litig. III), 270 F. Supp. 2d 313, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Michael J. Bazyler, The 
Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 11, 
15 (2002)). 
 34. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 22. 
 35. See Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed 
Oct. 3, 1996); Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. CV-96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed 
Oct. 21, 1996); World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc., v. Union Bank of 
Switzerland, No. CV-97-0461 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 1997). For more details regarding 
these cases, see Burt Neuborne, Litigation in a Free Society: Preliminary Reflections on 
Aspect of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 805 
(2002) [hereinafter Neuborne, Litigation in a Free Society]; Bazyler, Nuremberg in 
America, supra note 13, at 31. 
 36. See Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 13, at 31; see, e.g., Neuborne, 
Litigation in a Free Society, supra note 35, at 796 n.2. The 1995 Swiss governmental 
audits of unclaimed accounts showed a total of some tens of millions of dollars in 
dormant Nazi-era accounts. See Ganz, supra note 30, at 1349 n.285; see also Michael J. 
Bazyler & Amber L. Fitzgerald, Trading with the Enemy: Holocaust Restitution, the 
United States Government, and American Industry, 28 BROOK J. INT’L L. 683, 713 
(2003). The plaintiffs, however, demanded payment of $1.5 billion. See BAZYLER, 
HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 28. On May 2, 1996, the Independent Committee 
of Eminent Persons, headed by ex-Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, was charged 
with the additional audit. Paul A. Volcker, Dormant Accounts in Swiss Banks: The Inde-
pendent Committee of Eminent Persons, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 514–15 (1998). The 
Volcker Committee consisted of representatives from Jewish groups and financial institu-
tions. Id. According to the committee, the value of the accounts was approximately $643 
million to $1.36 billion, including interest. Overview, HOLOCAUST VICTIMS ASSETS LITIG. 
(SWISS BANKS) (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Overview.aspx [here-
inafter Overview, SWISS BANKS]. For more details on its constitution and work, see gen-
erally Volcker, supra. On December 13, 1996, the Swiss Parliament established a second 
committee, known as the Bergier Commission, to examine how money and assets had 
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ing to insurance policies issued by Swiss insurance carriers,37 slave la-
bor,38 denial of entry into or expulsion from Switzerland,39 and, most 
relevantly, looted assets disposed of or transacted through Switzerland.40 
The case, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation,41 was epoch-making 
as the first successful class action lawsuit stemming from WWII and, at 
$1.25 billion,42 the largest settlement in American human rights litigation 
at that time.43 
Beginning in 1998, several class action lawsuits were filed in the Unit-
ed States against German companies arising from their Aryanization of 
properties and use of forced labor during WWII.44 In March 2000 the 
                                                                                                             
found their way into Switzerland in connection with Nazi politics in the period prior to, 
during, and directly after WWII. Overview, SWISS BANKS, supra. In its 1998 interim re-
port the Bergier Commission dealt with the wartime gold transactions between Switzer-
land and Germany. Id. The 1999 interim report addressed Switzerland’s questionable 
Holocaust-era refugee policy. Id. The Bergier Commission published its final conclusions 
on March 22, 2002. Id. For more details on the Bergier Commission, see Bazyler & Fitz-
gerald, supra, at 715–18; see also Lawrence Collins, Reflections on Holocaust Claims in 
International Law, 41 ISR. L. REV. 402, 406, 439–40 (2008). 
 37. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. (Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. I), 105 F. 
Supp. 2d 139, 160 (E.D.N.Y 2000). 
 38. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. (Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. II), 413 F.3d 
183, 185 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. The final settlement agreement created classes of claimants eligible under the 
settlement: the Deposited Assets Class; Slave Labor Class I; the Refugee Class; Slave 
Labor Class II; Looted Assets Class; and the Insurance Class. Holocaust Victim Assets 
Litig. I, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 154–63. In accordance with U.S. class action law, the court 
was provided notice of the proposed settlement and it affirmed its fairness. Id. at 160. For 
more details on the Swiss Banks Settlement and the class action procedure, with clear 
indication of all court decisions and issues still pending, see Overview, SWISS BANKS, 
supra note 36. 
 42. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 32. 
 43. LUBINA, supra note 1, at 162; Michael J. Reppas II, Empty “International” Muse-
ums’ Trophy Cases of Their Looted Treasures and Return Stolen Property to the Coun-
tries of Origin and the Rightful Heirs of Those Wrongfully Dispossessed, 36 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 93, 98 (2007); Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and 
Fog: Permitting Litigation to Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art 
Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 199 (2006); Schlegelmilch, supra note 15, at 91. In ex-
change for the settlement amount, all existing and future claims relating to the Holocaust, 
WWII, its prelude, and its aftermath against Swiss banks, the Swiss government and oth-
er Swiss entities were discharged. Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. I, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 
142. For the sake of completeness it should be observed that similar settlements would 
soon be agreed with other European banks, insurance companies, and industries that had 
taken advantage of wartime activities. See Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 697–
709. 
 44. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 691–92. 
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German Bundestag announced a global settlement of these claims.45 On 
August 2, 2000, it adopted legislation establishing the foundation “Re-
membrance, Responsibility and Future” (Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verant-
wortung und Zukunft”), charged with recompensing former slave and 
forced laborers and other victims of National Socialism.46 Payments were 
disbursed during 2001–200747 to citizens of over 100 countries, totaling 
over 1.66 million individuals, who collectively received €4.4 billion.48 
In addition to the reemergence of the general debate on Nazi-looted as-
sets, the issue of the restitution of cultural objects also capitalized upon 
developments regarding the 1953 London Agreement on German Exter-
nal Debts (“London Agreement”).49 The London Agreement was a debt 
relief treaty that, as a key element of stability in the Atlantic bloc, settled 
Germany’s debts from the interwar period to reestablish the country in 
the international capital markets.50 According to the London Agreement, 
Germany could postpone certain payments until the time of reunifica-
tion.51 As the 1990 Unification Treaty rendered due the debts under the 
                                                                                                             
 45. Overview, SWISS BANKS, supra note 36. 
 46. Under National Socialism, around 8.4 million civilian forced laborers from out-
side Germany and 4.5 million prisoners of war were deployed as slave and forced labor-
ers in concentration camps, work camps, and other places of detention, industry, agricul-
ture, and public administrations from 1939 until the end of WWII. Origins of the Founda-
tion EVZ, STIFTUNG EVZ, http://www.stiftung-evz.de/eng/about-us/origins (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2011) (Ger.). The official website of the Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung 
und Zukunft” [Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”] offers more de-
tails on the German Forced Labor Settlement, see generally STIFTUNG EVZ, 
http://www.stiftung-evz.de (last visited Sept. 17, 2011) (Ger.). 
 47. Origins of the Foundation EVZ, supra note 46. 
 48. Id.; see Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwortung und 
Zukunft” [Act on the Creation of a Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Fu-
ture”], Aug. 2, 2000, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL. I], at 1263 (Ger.). The Act entered 
into force on August 12, 2000, and was last amended on September 1, 2008. See Fünftes 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung einer Stiftung “Erinnerung, Verantwor-
tung und Zukunft” [Fifth Act to amend the Act on the Creation of a Foundation “Re-
membrance, Responsibility and Future”], Sept. 1, 2008, BGBL. I, at 1797 (Ger.); Con-
way, supra note 17, at 381–82. 
 49. See generally Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 
333 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 50. Id.; see Eric Toussaint, The Marshall Plan and the Debt Agreement on German 
Debt, COMM. FOR THE ABOLITION OF THIRD WORLD DEBT (Oct. 24, 2006), 
http://www.cadtm.org/The-Marshall-Plan-and-the-Debt; see also Neuborne, Litigation in 
a Free Society, supra note 35, at 813–14. 
 51. Agreement on German External Debts, supra note 49, art. 25; see Jennifer An-
glim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the Need for Repose in Nazi-
Looted Art Disputes: Creation of an International Tribunal, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155, 161 
(2007) [hereinafter Kreder, Resolving Nazi-Looted Art Disputes]. 
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1953 moratorium, the debate on the unsolved economic consequences of 
WWII revived.52 Following the much publicized 1997 London Confer-
ence on Nazi Gold, which questioned the whereabouts of gold reserves 
seized during the war from the central banks of occupied nations,53 the 
desire to come to terms with the past took hold in other countries.54 The 
final years of the twentieth century saw the establishment of numerous 
national research commissions charged with scrutinizing various mani-
festations of Nazi era spoliation, covering all classes of assets from real 
                                                                                                             
 52. In the landmark case Krakauer v. Federal Republic of Germany, the court “abro-
gate[ed] the temporary immunity from suit for claims arising out of [WWII] that had 
been granted to German industry by the London Debt Agreement of 1953.” Neuborne, 
Litigation in a Free Society, supra note 35, at 813; see Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 13, 1996, 94 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 315 (Ger.); see also Landgericht [LG] [Trial 
Court] Bonn, Nov. 5, 1997, 1 * 134/92 (1997), rev’d on other grounds, Oberland-
esgericht Köln [OLG Köln] [Court of Appeals Cologne] Dec. 3, 1998, 52 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1555 (1999) (Ger.); see also Anja Hense, Entste-
hung und Konzeption der Stiftun, „Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft” für die 
Opfer von Zwangsarbeit und ‚Arisierung’ [Emergence and Conception of the Foundation 
“Memory, Responsibility and Future” for the Victims of Forced Labour and ‘Aryaniza-
tion’], in ZWANGSARBEIT IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS UND DIE ROLLE DER JUSTIZ [FORCED 
LABOR UNDER NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE LAW] 104 (Helmut Kramer et 
al. eds., 2007); Stuart M. Kreindler, Comment, History’s Accounting: Liability Issues 
Surrounding German Companies for the Use of Slave Labor by Their Corporate Forefa-
thers, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 343, 354–56 (2000); Graham O’Donoghue, Note, Precatory 
Executive Statements and Permissible Judicial Responses in the Context of Holocaust-
Claims Litigation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1125–26 (2006). 
 53. The claimant countries are Albania, Austria, Belgium, the former Czechoslovakia, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and former Yugoslavia. For more 
details on this topic, see generally WERNER RINGS, RAUBGOLD AUS DEUTSCHLAND: DIE 
«GOLDDREHSCHEIBE» SCHWEIZ IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG [ROBBED GOLD FROM GERMANY: 
THE SWISS “TURNTABLE FOR GOLD” DURING WORLD WAR II] (1985); Neal M. Sher et al., 
The Search for Nazi Assets: A Historical Perspective, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 7, 15–18 
(1998). Also refer to the website of the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of 
Monetary Gold, which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France established in 
September 1946. Tripartite Gold Commission (“TGC”), BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND 
CANADIAN AFFAIRS: U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 24, 1997), 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/tripartite_gold_commission.html. The TGC was 
created by Part III of the Paris Agreement on Reparation, signed on January 14, 1946, 
concerning German war reparations. Id. In particular, the TGC was charged with recover-
ing looted monetary gold. Id. 
 54. BRAILLARD, supra note 30, at 143–44; see also LUBINA, supra note 1, at 163. For 
more details on the 1997 London Nazi Gold Conference, see generally NAZI GOLD: THE 
LONDON CONFERENCE: 2–4 DECEMBER 1997 (Foreign & Commonwealth Office ed., 
1998). 
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property,55 gold,56 bonds,57 securities,58 bank deposits,59 and insurance 
monies60 to movables and works of art.61 In the United States, that role 
was assumed by the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust 
Assets in the United States (“Presidential Commission”). The Presiden-
tial Commission conducted research into and advised the President on 
policies regarding assets taken from victims of the Holocaust that came 
into the possession of the United States’ federal government.62 In the fi-
nal days of the Clinton presidency, the Commission presented its com-
prehensive final report, entitled, Plunder and Restitution: The U.S. and 
Holocaust Victims’ Assets. The report commented on the insufficient 
implementation of restitution policies in the United States and Europe 
                                                                                                             
 55. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS (PCHA), 
PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION: THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS’ ASSETS (2000) [herein-
after PLUNDER & RESTITUTION], available at 
http://pcha.ushmm.org/PlunderRestitution.html/html/Home_Contents.html. 
 56. Id.; McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 144. 
 57. PLUNDER & RESTITUTION, supra note 55. 
 58. Id.; McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 144. 
 59. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 163. 
 60. See Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 13, at 149–59. 
 61. The website of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum is an invaluable source of 
information concerning the principal governmental and private attempts of forty-seven 
countries to trace Holocaust assets. U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, 
http://www.ushmm.org/assets/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). Even more com-
prehensive and dealing in particular with the issue of Nazi-era looted cultural property 
are the national reports, which are freely accessible on the website of the Central Registry 
of Information on Looted Cultural Property 1933-1945, an initiative of the Commission 
for Looted Art in Europe. LOOTEDART.COM, http://www.lootedart.com (last visited Sept. 
7, 2011). Combined, these websites offer information on the following countries: Alba-
nia, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Ser-
bia/Yugoslavia. U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, supra; LOOTEDART.COM, supra. 
 62. See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186, 112 
Stat. 611 (1998); see also Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 748–59; Conway, supra 
note 17, at 385; McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 143; Tyler, supra note 25, at 467–69; 
Walton, supra note 26, at 606; Emily J. Henson, Comment, The Last Prisoners of War: 
Returning World War II Art to Its Rightful Owners—Can Moral Obligations Be Translat-
ed into Legal Duties?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 1155–56 (2002); Predita C. Rostomian, 
Note, Looted Art in the U.S. Market, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 271, 284 (2002). For more on 
the Holocaust Assets Commission Act, see supra notes 43, 151–55 and accompanying 
text. 
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and made a series of recommendations to promote further research and 
creative solutions to restitution policy issues.63 
B. Nazi Era Looted Art at the Center of Attention 
While most research bodies considered works of art as merely one type 
of spoliated assets, the restitution of looted cultural property only became 
the center of attention around 1998.64 At that time, Jewish interest groups 
all over the globe called on national governments to properly address the 
enduring injustice of Nazi era art spoliation.65 The emotional nature of 
their claims struck a sympathetic note, and soon the movement gained a 
firmer footing. Numerous special commissions to support recovery were 
established,66 revised museum guidelines and codes of conduct widely 
                                                                                                             
 63. PLUNDER & RESTITUTION, supra note 55. 
 64. Kreder, Resolving Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, supra note 51, at 167–70; see 
McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 141; Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Media-
tion/Arbitration Commission to Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or Looted 
During World War II, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 27, 47 (1999); Walton, supra 
note 26, at 607; Cuba, supra note 14, at 463–64; Derrossett, supra note 12, at 234–35; 
Falconer, supra note 19, at 390; Schlegelmilch, supra note 15, at 101; see also Marilyn 
Henry, Talking Looted Art, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 23, 2008, at 14; Thomas W. Lippman, 
44 Nations Pledge to Act on Art Looted by the Nazis: Guidelines to Restore Ownership, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1998, at A2. 
 65. Around the mid-1990s, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Ger-
many was a long-established organization. About Us, CLAIMS CONF., 
http://www.claimscon.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). Since 1951, its mission had al-
ways been to secure justice for Jewish victims of Nazi persecution and to seek the return 
of Jewish property lost during the Holocaust. Id. Affiliated with the World Jewish Con-
gress and the 1992 World Jewish Restitution Organization, the Commission for Art Re-
covery is a nonprofit organization, established in 1997, to stimulate restitution efforts by 
European governments. About, COMM’N FOR ART RECOVERY, 
http://www.commartrecovery.org/content/about (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). The com-
mission encourages and assists governments, museums, and other public institutions to 
identify works of art in their collections that may have been stolen between 1933 and 
1945, under the dominion of the Third Reich, to publicize these works on the Internet and 
adopt streamlined procedures that facilitate the return of these works to their rightful 
owners. Mission, COMM’N FOR ART RECOVERY, 
http://www.commartrecovery.org/content/mission (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 66. The Holocaust Claims Processing Office of the New York State Banking De-
partment was established in 1997 to provide institutional assistance to individuals seeking 
to recover Holocaust-looted assets. See History and Mission, HOLOCAUST CLAIMS 
PROCESSING OFF., http://www.claims.state.ny.us/hist.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
From the outset, the recovery of looted artwork was one of the office’s priorities. See id.; 
see also BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 213. In September 1997, the 
Washington, D.C. National Jewish Museum established the Holocaust Art Restitution 
Project (“HARP”), to document and publish the Jewish cultural losses. See Judith H. 
Dobrzynski, For What Nazis Stole, A Longtime Art Hound, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1997, at 
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adopted,67 collections routinely vetted,68 museum acquisition and deac-
cession policies questioned,69 dealers and auctioneers criticized,70 and 
                                                                                                             
B7; see also BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 213; Schwartz, supra note 
15, at 21. In 1999, the Commission for Looted Art in Europe (“CLAE”) was founded. 
About Us, COMM’N FOR LOOTED ART IN EUR., 
http://www.lootedartcommission.com/Services (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
COMM’N FOR LOOTED ART]. It is an “international, expert and nonprofit representative 
body, which researches, identifies and recovers looted property on behalf of families, 
communities, institutions and governments worldwide . . . In 2001, the Commission [set 
up] the Central Registry of Information on Looted Cultural Property 1933–1945[,]” a 
central repository of information on Nazi looting. Id. The Central Registry is affiliated 
with the University of Oxford, as it operates under the auspices of the Oxford Centre for 
Hebrew and Jewish Studies. Id. For more information on the Central Registry, see 
LOOTEDART.COM, supra note 61. For the sake of completeness, the International Founda-
tion for Art Research (“IFAR”) and the Art Loss Register (“ALR”) cannot go unrecorded. 
INT’L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH [IFAR], http://www.ifar.org/about.php (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2011); ART LOSS REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com (last visited Sept. 20, 
2011). 
  Although these organizations have been founded long before the reemergence of 
the debate on Holocaust art, they clearly consider the looted art issue an integral part of 
their mission. See IFAR, supra; ART LOSS REGISTER, supra. As high-profile attempts to 
deter any type of illicit art trade, both IFAR and the ALR were predestined to take the 
lead in the Holocaust art restitution debate. See IFAR, supra; ART LOSS REGISTER, supra. 
  For an overview of national initiatives stimulating identification and restitution of 
Nazi era looted works of art at the end of the 1990s with regard to the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Sweden, Norway, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and South Africa, see PALMER, supra 
note 24, at 129–49. The website of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum offers a more 
elaborate discussion of the national initiatives (including special historical commissions) 
in the countries that participated in the Washington Conference. See U.S. HOLOCAUST 
MEM’L MUSEUM, supra note 61. 
 67. On June 4, 1998, the Association of Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”) endorsed 
the Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art during the Nazi/World War 
II Era (1933–1945), containing guidelines to “assist museums in resolving claims, recon-
ciling the interests of individuals who were dispossessed of works of art or their heirs 
together with the fiduciary and legal obligations and responsibilities of art museums and 
their trustees to the public.” See ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIR. [AAMD], REPORT OF THE 
AAMD TASK FORCE ON THE SPOLIATION OF ART DURING THE NAZI/WORLD WAR II ERA 
(1933–1945) (1998) [hereinafter AAMD TASK FORCE REPORT], available at 
http://www.aamd.org/papers/guideln.php. 
  On January 14, 1999, the International Council of Museums (“ICOM”) issued the 
ICOM Recommendations Concerning the Return of Works of Art Belonging to Jewish 
Owners, calling upon its members to screen their collections for Nazi era spoliated items, 
to publish the result of these screenings and to actively address their return to their right-
ful owners. See Press Release, Int’l Council of Museums, ICOM Recommendations Con-
cerning the Return of Works of Art Belonging to Jewish Owners (Jan. 14, 1999), availa-
ble at http://archives.icom.museum/worldwar2.html. 
2011] LET’S NOT TALK ABOUT TEREZÍN 133 
Holocaust-related legislation passed.71 Above all, however, the world 
witnessed a genuine explosion of Nazi era art disputes that shook the art 
                                                                                                             
  In November of 1999, the American Association of Museums (“AAM”) approved 
the Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appropriation of Objects during the Nazi Era, 
which also intended to assist museums in addressing issues relating to objects that may 
have been looted during the Nazi era. See Guidelines Concerning the Unlawful Appro-
priation of Objects During the Nazi Era, AM. ASS’N OF MUSEUMS [AAM] (Apr. 2001), 
http://aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/upload/ethicsguidelines_naziera.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Unlawful Appropriation Guidelines]. 
  Pursuant to an agreement reached in October 2000 between the AAM, the 
AAMD, and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United 
States, the AAM formulated the Recommended Procedures for Providing Information to 
the Public about Objects Transferred in Europe during the Nazi Era. See AAM Recom-
mended Procedures for Providing Information to the Public About Objects Transferred 
in Europe During the Nazi Era, AAM, http://www.aam-
us.org/museumresources/prov/procedures.cfm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 68. See, e.g., Stephen E. Weil, U.S Museums to Provide Expanded Information about 
Objects Transferred in Europe during the Nazi Era, 4 IFAR J., no. 2, 2001 at 10–11 
[hereinafter Weil, U.S. Museums’ Information About Nazi Era Objects]; John J. Gold-
man, Museums Press Hunt for Art Nazis Stole, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2000, at A18; Diane 
Haithman, Getty Puts List of Paintings with Nazi-Era Gaps on Web, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 
2000, at F2. In 1997, the AAMD asked its members to “begin immediately to review the 
provenance of works in their collections to attempt to ascertain whether any were unlaw-
fully confiscated during the Nazi/World War II era and never restituted.” See AAMD 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 67. Following an agreement between the AAMD, the 
AAM, and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United 
States, the AAM created a website entitled the Nazi-Era Provenance Internet Portal 
(“NEPIP”), which serves as a publicly accessible resource for information on objects in 
U.S. museum collections that changed hands in Continental Europe between 1933 and 
1945. See NAZI-ERA PROVENANCE INTERNET PORTAL PROJECT, http://www.nepip.org (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter NEPIP]. Since September 2003, more than 28,000 
objects have been posted by 165 U.S. art museums. Id. AAMD member museums also 
have posted information on their websites regarding works in their collections that 
changed hands under the Nazi reign. See Who Should Participate?, in NEPIP, supra. 
 69. See, e.g., Daniel Range, Comment, Deaccessioning and Its Costs in the Holocaust 
Art Context: The United States and Great Britain, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 655, 665–73 (2004); 
Elaine L. Johnston, Cultural Property and World War II: Implications for American Mu-
seums, Practical Considerations for the Museum Administrator, SC40 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 29 
(1998) (commenting on a list of steps that a museum should take in considering an acqui-
sition); see also Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections 
and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museum to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
409, 436–45 (2003). 
 70. See, e.g., Louise Jury, British Art Dealers Prop Up Market for Nazi Loot, INDEP. 
(London), Mar. 5, 2000, at 5; see generally Kiesha Minyard, Comment, Adding Tools to 
the Arsenal: Options for Restitution from the Intermediary Seller and Recovery for Good-
Faith Possessors of Nazi-Looted Art, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 115 (2007). 
 71. For example, on February 13, 1998, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act was 
signed into law. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 
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world to its foundations. Worldwide, dozens of heirs to Holocaust vic-
tims approached public and private collectors to lay claims to valuable 
paintings in their holdings.72 By the change of the millennium, a multi-
tude of restitution negotiations were initiated with many more in the of-
fing.73 The generation of original postwar purchasers began to shrink 
drastically, leaving behind heirs who unsuspectingly caught the public’s 
attention by putting their heirlooms up for auction or making donations 
to museums and other public institutions.74 Indeed, the current upsurge in 
claims would not have occurred were it not for the resurfacing of the 
                                                                                                             
(1998). It aims to provide “redress for inadequate restitution of assets seized by the Unit-
ed States Government during World War II which belonged to victims of the Holocaust 
and for other purposes,” by authorizing the President to financially support organizations 
assisting Holocaust survivors and archival/translation services. Id. In October 1998, the 
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act was passed, in order to make public WWII criminal 
records. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859 (1998); 
see also U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186, 112 Stat. 
611 (1998) (establishing the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in 
the United States). For more on the Holocaust-related legislation in the United States, see 
McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 142–44. For some examples of legislation passed in 
European countries that suffered a lot under the German occupation, see, for example, 
Décret no 99-778 du 10 septembre 1999 instituant une commission pour l’indemnisation 
des victims de spoliations intervenues du fait des législations antisémites en vigueur pen-
dant l’Occupation [Decree No. 99-778 of September 10, 1999 establishing a Commission 
for the Indemnification of the Victims of Spoliations which occurred as a result of Anti-
Semitic Legislation in Force during the Occupation], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 11, 1999, p. 13633 
(Fr.); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE RÜCKGABE VON KUNSTGEGENSTÄNDEN AUS DEN 
ÖSTERREICHISCHEN BUNDESMUSEEN UND SAMMLUNGEN [ACT ON THE RESTITUTION OF 
ARTWORKS FROM AUSTRIAN MUSEUMS AND COLLECTIONS] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL 
I] No. 181/1998, § 1 (Austria), available at 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1998_181_1/1998_181_1.pdf; Arrêté royal 
portant création d’une Commission d’étude sur le sort des biens délaissés par les mem-
bres de la communauté juive de Belgique lors de leur déportation pendant la guerre 1940-
1945 [Royal Decree Founding a Research Commission into the Fate of the Belgian Jew-
ish Community’s Assets after the Deportation during the War of 1940-1945] of July 6, 
1997, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], July 12, 1997 (Belg.). 
 72. See, e.g., LUBINA, supra note 1, at 32; THE SPOILS OF WAR, supra note 24, at 15–
16, 241–43. 
 73. For a comprehensive overview of early Nazi era art restitution claims, see Ste-
phen W. Clark, World War II Restitution Cases, SP035 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 371, 373–400 
(2009). 
 74. Hector Feliciano et al., Nazi Stolen Art, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 67, 73 (1998) 
(“Now, as the generation that lived through World War II shrinks, works of art that made 
their way out of Nazi-controlled Europe or the chaos of post-war Europe will begin to 
resurface through donations or dispositions by heirs.”); McCarter Collins, supra note 15, 
at 120; Pell, supra note 64, at 46 
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spoliated works in the art market or in publicly exhibited collections.75 
Moreover, with the breakthrough of the Internet and online databases of 
stolen art, tracking down looted artwork took less patience, perseverance, 
and luck than ever. Resultantly, the international market and collections 
became much easier to monitor.76 Finally, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the popular interest in spoliated art is partially due to the soaring 
prices in the booming art market of the recent decades. Whereas, in the 
past, the potential price tag of litigation had a deterrent effect, the ex-
pected value of the case—particularly given the high valuation of art-
work in the early 2000s—is likely to exceed litigation costs, encouraging 
victims to come forward.77 
II. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF NAZI ART 
SPOLIATION 
The international community soon realized that the worldwide explo-
sion of Nazi era art disputes could only be adequately dealt with at the 
international level. Over the past thirteen years, several agreements have 
been adopted at the international level—evidence of the international 
community’s renewed attention to the problem of Nazi era art spoliation, 
and societal commitment to come to terms with the enduring injustices of 
WWII. The following analysis examines these instruments of public in-
ternational law in chronological order and comments on their legal pur-
port, which, in spite of enthusiastic rhetoric, remains limited. 
                                                                                                             
 75. Feliciano et al., supra note 74, at 73; McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 120; 
Pell, supra note 64, at 46; Spiegler, supra note 14, at 299; Minkovich, supra note 15, at 
354. 
 76. Elizabeth Neff, Nazi-Era Art Probe Takes to the Internet, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 
2000, at 1; see Elisabeth Olson, Web Site Goes Online to Find Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at E4; see also BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 
262–66; Joseph F. Sawka, Reconciling Policy and Equity: The Ability of the Internal 
Revenue Code to Resolve Disputes Regarding Nazi-Looted Art, 17 U. MIAMI INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 91, 98–99 (2009). For somewhat visionary comments on how the internet 
was seen, in 1998, as the ultimate solution for the title problems in the trade of art and 
antiquities, see Laura McFarland-Taylor, Comment, Tracking Stolen Artworks on the 
Internet: A New Standard for Due Diligence, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
937, 939 (1998). On September 13, 2011, 173 American museums had uploaded the re-
sults of the provenance research of their collection to the Nazi-Era Provenance Internet 
Portal. See NEPIP, supra note 68. Other countries have similar internet databases. See 
infra note 290 and accompanying text. 
 77. Graefe, supra note 22, at 476; Steven A. Reiss & Jonathan Bloom, The Good 
Faith Owner and the Tardy Heir, 10 IFAR J., no. 2, 2008 at 13; Weiss, supra note 15, at 
868. For some interesting comments with regard to the cost of art litigation, see Sawka, 
supra note 76, at 100–01. 
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A. The Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art 
To a large extent, the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-
Confiscated Art (“Washington Principles”) had their origin in the events 
surrounding Egon Schiele’s Portrait of Wally,78 and in the resulting re-
                                                                                                             
 78. In 1997, the Viennese Leopold Museum loaned Schiele’s Portrait of Wally to 
MoMA for a grand retrospective on the artist. Derek Fincham, Why U.S. Federal Crimi-
nal Penalties for Dealing in Illicit Cultural Property are Ineffective, and a Pragmatic 
Alternative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 625 (2007). Prior to the war, however, 
the painting belonged to Lea Bondi, a Jewish art dealer, who sold her collection under 
duress in order to flee Austria in 1938. Id. The portrait ended up in the private collection 
of Professor Rudolph Leopold, which became accessible to the public in 1994. Id. In 
January 1998, only moments before the painting was to be shipped back to its home 
country, the District Attorney’s Office issued a grand jury subpoena at the request of the 
Bondi heirs. Id. at 625–26. The action was part of a criminal investigation into stolen 
property and the starting point of more than ten years of litigation. See id. at 626. At the 
time, the bold act of the District Attorney launched a world outcry over Nazi era art spo-
liation to all collectors and alerted many institutions of the need to examine their collec-
tions for objects with questionable provenance. Id.; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces 
Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998), 
rev’d, People v. Museum of Modern Art (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 688 
N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. App. Div.), motion granted, 719 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y.), motion granted, 
1999 N.Y. LEXIS 2130 (N.Y.), motion granted, 1999 N.Y LEXIS 2131 (N.Y.), motion 
granted, 1999 N.Y LEXIS 2132 (N.Y.), rev’d, 719 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1999), related pro-
ceeding at, United States v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y.), reargu-
ment denied by, motion granted by, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18713 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
summary judgment granted by, claim dismissed by, motion denied by, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), summary judgment denied by, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), stipulation and order of settlement and discontinuance, No. 99-CV-
09940 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2010). The Schiele case was broadly covered in the press and 
commented on in countless law review articles, see, for example, Susan E. Brabenec, 
Casenote, The Art of Determining “Stolen Property:” United States v. Portrait of Wally, 
A Painting by Egon Schiele, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1369, 1385–89 (2001); Lawrence M. Kaye, A Quick Glance at the Schiele Paintings, 10 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 11, 11–22, 26 (1999); Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The 
Choice between Civil and Criminal Remedies in Stolen Art Litigation, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1199, 1224–31 (2005); Martha Lufkin, The Subpoena Heard Round the 
World, 4 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 363, 363–73 (1999) (U.K.); Martha Lufkin, Why Nazi Loot 
Ceased Being “Stolen” when US Forces Seized it in Austria: The Federal Schiele Case, 
5 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 305, 305–17 (2000) (U.K.); Martha Lufkin, Whistling Past the 
Graveyard isn’t Enough, 7 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 207, 207–17 (2002) (U.K.); Spiegler, 
supra note 14, at 306–12; Wissbroecker, supra note 24, at 44–53; Daniel J. Bender, Case 
Commentary, In Re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on 
the Museum of Modern Art, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 109, 109–16, 123 (1998); Alex-
ander Kaplan, Note, The Need for Statutory Protection from Seizure for Art Exhibitions: 
The Egon Schiele Seizures and Implications for Major Museum Exhibitions, 7 J.L. & 
POL’Y 691, 691–99 (1999); Shira T. Shapiro, Case Note, How Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann and United States v. Portrait of Wally Relay the Past and Forecast the Future of 
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port of the American Association of Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”) 
Task Force on the Spoliation of Art during the Nazi/World War II Era 
(1933–1945), stating principles and guidelines to deal with Nazi-looted 
art.79 The 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets served 
the United States’ ambition to procure international endorsement of the 
earlier AAMD report.80 
The Washington Conference was widely supported. From November 
30 until December 3, 1998, the United States Holocaust Memorial Mu-
seum welcomed delegations from forty-four countries and thirteen non-
governmental organizations.81 The meeting’s agenda was set on 
“forg[ing] an international consensus on how governments and other en-
tities can cooperate to redress grave injustices that remain from the Hol-
ocaust era.”82 On December 3, 1998, the delegates reached a consensus 
on an eleven-point statement of principles, the Washington Principles, 
that aimed to 1) simplify the process of identifying Nazi-looted art ob-
jects; 2) track down prewar owners; and 3) settle conflicting claims to 
property.83 
In relation to the identification process, Principle I lays down the ge-
neric obligation, according to which “[a]rt that had been confiscated by 
                                                                                                             
Nazi Looted-Art Restitution Litigation, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1147, 1154–59 (2008); 
Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Zealous Collector— A Special Report: A Singular Passion for 
Amassing Art, One Way or Another, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at E1; Catherine Hickley 
& Zoe Schneeweiss, Vienna’s Leopold Pays $19 Million to Keep Schiele’s ‘Wally’, 
BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-21/vienna-s-
leopold-pays-19-million-to-keep-schiele-s-wally-.html. 
 79. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 193; Jennifer Anglim Kreder, 
The Revolution in U.S. Museums Concerning the Ethics of Acquiring Antiquities, 64 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 997, 1022 (2010) [hereinafter Kreder, Ethics Revolution in U.S. Muse-
ums]. For the text of the AAMD Report on Nazi-era Art Spoliation, see REPORT OF THE 
AAMD TASK FORCE, supra note 67. 
 80. See EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 193–94; LUBINA, supra note 
1, at 175; Kreder, Resolving Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, supra note 51, at 169; see also 
Graefe, supra note 22, at 503. 
 81. Bazyler & Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 710; Kreder, Resolving Nazi-Looted Art 
Disputes, supra note 51, at 169–70; McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 141; Pell, supra 
note 64, at 47; Walton, supra note 26, at 607; Cuba, supra note 14, at 463–64; Derrossett, 
supra note 19, at 234–35; Falconer, supra note 19, at 390; Schlegelmilch, supra note 15, 
at 101; see also Lippman, supra note 64, at A2. 
 82. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec’y of State for Econ., Bus., & Agric. Affairs, On-
the-Record Briefing on Holocaust-Era Conference (Nov. 24, 1998), available at 
http://fcit.usf.edu/HOLOCAUST/resource/assets/holocaus.htm. 
 83. McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 141. 
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the Nazis and not subsequently restituted should be identified.”84 Princi-
ples II to IV prescribe more specific measures to overcome the difficul-
ties that victims of art looting typically experience.85 Principle II instructs 
governments to make accessible to researchers all relevant records and 
archives.86 Principle III directs the signatory countries to make available 
resources and personnel to facilitate the identification of all art confiscat-
ed by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted.87 According to Principle 
IV, however, consideration should be given to “unavoidable gaps or am-
biguities in the provenance of an object in light of the . . . [passage] of 
time and the circumstances of the 1933–1945 period,”88 as in many cases 
it is likely that the entire truth of the events that happened more than fifty 
years ago will remain unknown forever. It is not surprising that, in nu-
merous cases original owners will find it difficult to provide impervious 
and voluminous evidence of their title.89 
Once an artwork is confirmed as having been looted during WWII, the 
search for its original owner is the next step. In that connection, Principle 
V requires complete openness, as “[e]very effort should be made to pub-
licize art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis and not sub-
sequently restituted in order to locate its pre-War owners or their 
heirs.”90 Principle VI suggests establishing a central registry of such in-
formation, while Principle VII calls for measures to encourage prewar 
owners and their heirs to come forward and make known their claims to 
looted pieces of artwork.91 
With regard to the settlement of conflicting claims to looted property, 
the Washington Principles’ key objective is to achieve “a just and fair 
solution.”92 As to what “just and fair” solutions may be, the Washington 
Principles do not specify,93 yet the text’s cautious tone stands out, as per 
Principle VIII all signatories explicitly recognize that this may vary ac-
cording to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case.94 The 
                                                                                                             
 84. Washington Principles, supra note 9, princ. I. This webpage offers the full text of 
the Washington Principles, along with all conference material (reports, testimonies, etc.). 
Id. 
 85. See id. princs. II–IV. 
 86. Id. princ. II. 
 87. Id. princ. III. 
 88. LUBINA, supra note 1, at 176. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Washington Principles, supra note 9, princ.V. 
 91. Id. princs.VI, VII. 
 92. Id. princs. VIII, IX. 
 93. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The Holocaust, Museum Ethics and Legalism, 18 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 5 (2008). 
 94. Washington Principles, supra note 9, princ. VIII. 
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remainder of the text includes suggestions that may serve as a guide to 
achieve these “just and fair” solutions.95 In this connection, Principle X 
calls for the establishment of bodies with a balanced membership to 
identify confiscated art and to assist in addressing ownership issues.96 
Finally, Principle XI encourages signatory nations to develop national 
processes to implement the Washington Principles, particularly as they 
relate to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving owner-
ship issues.97 
The Washington Conference was undoubtedly successful in facilitating 
identification of looted artwork and its wartime owners.98 In response to 
the Washington Principles, numerous signatory countries have taken new 
efforts or expanded existing initiatives to enhance the degree of transpar-
ency and disclosure regarding the provenance of the artwork in national 
museums.99 Although the Principles undeniably led to a number of vol-
untary restitutions by both public and private collectors all over the 
globe,100 their net impact on the settlement of Holocaust-related title dis-
putes is less obvious. After all, in contrast to the elaborate praise by po-
litical leaders pronouncing the Washington events as redefining the man-
agement of Nazi-looted art,101 the international community’s legal com-
                                                                                                             
 95. See id. princs. IX–XI. 
 96. Id. princ. X; LUBINA, supra note 1, at 177. 
 97. Washington Principles, supra note 9, princ. XI; LUBINA, supra note 1, at 177. 
 98. See McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 142. 
 99. See infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text. 
 100. For some U.S. examples, see infra notes 357–63 and accompanying text. 
 101. The statement of Stuart Eizenstat, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Interna-
tional Trade and Special Envoy of the Department of State on Property Restitution in 
Central and Eastern Europe, is exemplary of this attitude: 
The art world will never be the same in the way it deals with Nazi-confiscated 
art. From now on, the sale, purchase, exchange, and display of art from this pe-
riod will be addressed with greater sensitivity and a higher international stand-
ard of responsibility. This is a major achievement which will reverberate 
through our museums, galleries, auction houses, and in the homes and hearts of 
those families who may now have the chance to have returned what is rightful-
ly theirs. This will also lead to the removal of uncertainty in the world art mar-
ket and facilitate commercial and cultural exchange. 
Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec’y of State for Econ., Bus., & Agric. Affairs, Concluding 
Statement at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets (Dec. 3, 1998) availa-
ble at http://fcit.usf.edu/HOLOCAUST/resource/assets/concl2.htm; see also Stuart E. 
Eizenstat, Art, Gold and Slave Labor: The U.S. Government’s Efforts on Behalf of Holo-
caust Victims, 6 IFAR  J., no. 3, 2007, at 27 [hereinafter Eizenstat, Art, Gold and Slave 
Labor] (quoting Philippe De Montebello, Director of the Metropolitan Museum) (“The 
art world has changed forever. The genie is out of the bottle. The secretive world of art 
will have to open up.”). 
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mitment remains remarkably limited. The Washington Principles’ open-
ing lines immediately recall “that among participating nations there are 
differing legal systems and that countries act within the context of their 
own laws,” thus adding to their vagueness and noncommittal nature.102 
Accordingly, the Washington Principles state mere moral obligations or 
guidelines, rather than binding legal duties.103 
B. The Council of Europe Resolution 1205 
Whereas the 1998 Washington Conference brought together an ad hoc 
group of delegations representing nations or interest groups, the restitu-
tion debate subsequently reached more established international fora.104 
In 1999, the Council of Europe, one of the oldest international organiza-
tions, buckled down to the issue of spoliation of Jewish cultural property. 
The Council’s interest in the matter, however, was neither surprising nor 
completely new, in view of its stated aim to promote awareness and en-
courage the development of Europe’s cultural identity and diversity. In 
that context, the Council of Europe had already adopted measures to en-
                                                                                                             
 102. Washington Principles, supra note 9; see also Kreder, Resolving Nazi-Looted Art 
Disputes, supra note 51, at 171. 
 103. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 259; McCarter Collins, supra 
note 15, at 142; Vanessa A. Wernicke, Comment, The “Retroactive” Application of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Recovering Nazi Looted Art, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1103, 1120–21 (2004); Derrossett, supra note 19, at 235; Falconer, supra note 19, at 391; 
Emily A. Maples, Comment, Holocaust Art: It isn’t Always “Finders Keepers, Losers 
Weepers”: A Look at Art Stolen During the Third Reich, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
355, 382–83 (2001); Pollock, supra note 43, at 204–05; Mullery, supra note 18, at 651; 
Range, supra note 69, at 668. 
 104. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 178. For the sake of completeness, it should be ob-
served that at the European Community level, the European Parliament had already 
adopted three resolutions that recognized the problem of Nazi era art looting prior to the 
Washington Conference. LUBINA, supra note 1, at 182–83. The first resolution was 
adopted on December 14, 1995. Resolution on the Return of Plundered Property to Jew-
ish Communities, 1996 O.J. (C 17) 141; see LUBINA, supra note 1, at 183. The scope of 
the resolution, however, was not limited to cultural property and must be understood 
against the background of the transition of the countries of the former Eastern Block after 
the fall of communism. LUBINA, supra note 1, at 183. The Resolution applauded the ac-
tions that various Central and Eastern European States—which at that time were not yet 
admitted to the European Union—had undertaken to return stolen property to Jewish 
communities. Id. For an interesting overview of these restitution initiatives taken in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, see Stephen A. Denburg, Note, Reclaiming Their Past: A Survey 
of Jewish Efforts to Restitute European Property, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 233, 235–59 
(1998). A second resolution, dealing with the restitution of property to Holocaust victims, 
was adopted on July 16, 1998. Resolution of 16 July 1998 on the Restitution of Property 
Belonging to Holocaust Victims, 1998 O.J. (C 292) 112, 166; see LUBINA, supra note 1, 
at 183. 
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courage the restoration of Jewish culture in Europe prior to the upsurge 
in Nazi era title disputes.105 On November 5, 1999, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, then representing forty-one nations, 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1205.106 The Resolution calls for the 
restitution of looted Jewish cultural property in Europe, in continuation 
of the attempts that were made following the end of WWII and the con-
ferences of Washington and London.107 
The Resolution’s scope differs from the Washington Principles, as it 
takes into consideration all possible causes of loss, such as forced sales 
or unofficial Aryanizations, rather than the straightforward confiscations 
the Washington Principles exclusively address.108 However, Resolution 
1205 is more limited with regard to the claimant group. Unlike the 
Washington Principles, its range is confined to “Jewish property,” which 
is not surprising in view of the Council’s ambition of restoring Jewish 
culture in Europe.109 
Unlike the Washington Principles and their vague aim at a “just and 
fair solution,” the resolution’s primary emphasis is on actual restitution, 
i.e. physical return of looted property to its original owners, their heirs, 
or their countries of origin.110 However, the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe is not entitled to adopt legally binding 
measures.111 Therefore, in order to meet its objectives, the Assembly 
could only invite the Committee of Ministers or the national parliaments 
to give immediate consideration to ways in which they may be able to 
facilitate the return of looted Jewish cultural property.112 In that regard, 
the remainder of Resolution 1205 contains a number of suggested ac-
                                                                                                             
 105. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. Ass., Resolution 885 on the Jewish Contribution to European 
Culture, 13th Sess. (1987), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/adoptedtext/ta87/eres885.htm#1; Eur. Parl. Ass., Rec-
ommendation 1291 on Yiddish Culture (1996), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta96/EREC1291.htm. 
 106. Eur. Parl. Ass., Resolution 1205 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, Res. No. 1205 (1999) [hereinafter Resolution 1205]; Range, supra note 69, at 
668. 
 107. Resolution 1205, supra note 106, paras. 4–5. 
 108. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 178–79; Patrick J. O’Keefe, The Draft Resolution on 
Looted Jewish Cultural Property Produced by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe, 4 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 313, 314 (1999) (U.K.) [hereinafter O’Keefe, Draft 
Resolution on Looted Jewish Cultural Property]. 
 109. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 178; see O’Keefe, Draft Resolution on Looted Jew-
ish Cultural Property, supra note 108, at 314. 
 110. Compare Washington Principles, supra note 9, princs.VIII, IX, with Resolution 
1205, supra note 106, para. 8. 
 111. LUBINA, supra note 1, at 180. 
 112. Resolution 1205, supra note 106, para. 10. 
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tions,113 or recommended legislative changes, such as “the extension or 
removal of statutory limitation periods, the removal of restrictions on 
alienability . . . [and] the waiving of export controls,”114 or even the an-
nulment of later bona fide acquired titles.115 
Unfortunately, the profoundness of the Resolution’s intended chang-
es—alterations of long established principles of civil law—ensured that 
the overambitious Resolution 1205 was never implemented. The Com-
mittee of Ministers did not act upon the suggestions of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, nor did the Resolution inspire the member states to significant 
reforms.116 
C. The Vilnius Forum Declaration 
Paragraph 19 of Resolution 1205 called for “the organisation of a Eu-
ropean conference, further to that held in Washington on the Holocaust 
era assets, with special reference to the return of cultural property and the 
relevant legislative reform.”117 The Government of Lithuania offered to 
serve as a host for the follow-up conference on the implementation of the 
Washington Principles and Resolution 1205.118 The International Forum 
on Holocaust-Era Looted Cultural Assets took place in Vilnius, under the 
auspices of the Council of Europe.119 
Although the meeting could be seen as a sign of the international 
community’s continued commitment to rectify outstanding injustices of 
                                                                                                             
 113. Paragraph 11 calls for the removal of all impediments to identification, such as 
laws, regulations or policies that prevent access to relevant information in government or 
public archives; Paragraph 12 recommends “bodies in receipt of government funds,” 
which find themselves holding looted Jewish cultural property to return it, and Paragraph 
17 aims at establishing out-of-court forms of dispute resolution. Resolution 1205, supra 
note 106, paras. 11, 12, 17; see O’Keefe, Draft Resolution on Looted Jewish Cultural 
Property, supra note 108, at 314–15, 320–21. 
 114. The legislative changes to be considered by the national parliaments are treated in 
Paragraph 13. Resolution 1205, supra note 106, para. 13; LUBINA, supra note 1, at 180; 
O’Keefe, Draft Resolution on Looted Jewish Cultural Property, supra note 108, at 315–
18. 
 115. See Resolution 1205, supra note 106, para. 15; see also O’Keefe, supra note 108, 
at 319; Sue Choi, Comment, The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After 
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS., 167, 196 n.221 (2005). 
 116. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 180. 
 117. Resolution 1205, supra note 106, para. 19. 
 118. See Kreder, supra note 31, at 172 n.18; Range, supra note 69, at 668. 
 119. Patrick J. O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum on Holocaust-Era Looted Cul-
tural Assets, Vilnius, Lithuania (October 3–5, 2000), 10 INT’L J. CULT. PROP. 127, 127 
(2001) [hereinafter, O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum]; Kreder, Resolving Nazi-
Looted Art Disputes, supra note 51, at 172; Range, supra note 69, at 668. 
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the Holocaust,120 it undoubtedly was a failure, as the Vilnius Forum fell 
short of producing anything that “significantly refine[d] or expand[ed the 
Washington Principles.]”121 Nor did the Vilnius Forum produce anything 
legally binding,122 which was particularly disappointing given the con-
ference’s ambition to seek legal reforms and implement the Washington 
Principles as well as Resolution 1205.123 
The final text, the Vilnius Forum Declaration, went no further than to 
“encourage[] all participating States to take all reasonable measures to 
implement the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated 
Art as well as Resolution 1205,”124 or to “welcome[] the progress being 
made by countries to take the measures necessary, within the context of 
their own laws, to assist in the identification and restitution.”125 Once 
more, the reserved tone of the Vilnius Forum Declaration stood out. 
At an early stage of the conference, it became clear that most partici-
pants to the Vilnius Forum did not want to amend their national legal 
systems. A comparison of the draft recommendations developed prior to 
the Vilnius Forum and the corresponding Vilnius Declaration that was 
eventually adopted gives a clear indication of what states were not pre-
pared to countenance.126 Some states rejected the draft’s suggestion for 
“the establishment of a Task Force on Holocaust-Era Looted Assets to 
monitor the implementation throughout Europe of the Washington Prin-
ciples, Council of Europe Resolution 1205 and the Vilnius Recommen-
dations” as “too drastic a step.”127 Accordingly, the Vilnius Declaration 
did not retain any suggestion of a watchdog and instead adopted the pro-
posal that “periodical international expert meetings [were to be held] to 
exchange views and experiences on the implementation” of the Washing-
ton Principles, Resolution 1205 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
                                                                                                             
 120. See McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 142–43; see also O’Keefe, Vilnius Inter-
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 121. Graefe, supra note 22, at 504; Kreder, Resolving Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, supra 
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O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum, supra note 119, at 127–32. 
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 124. Vilnius Forum Declaration, COMM’N. FOR LOOTED ART IN EUR. (Oct. 5, 2000), 
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 125. Id. para. 6. 
 126. O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum, supra note 119, at 130; see LUBINA, supra 
note 1, at 181–82. 
 127. O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum, supra note 119, at 130 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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Council of Europe, and the Vilnius Declaration.128 In addition, contrary 
to the draft, the Vilnius Declaration did not mention a word about the 
creation of a future international convention on the legal aspects of resti-
tution.129 Accordingly, the Vilnius Forum was nothing more than tea and 
sympathy for those countries that, since the Washington Conference, had 
actually undertaken some effort to achieve the restitution of looted cul-
tural assets to the original owners or their heirs. No changes to existing 
legal rules and norms were actually contemplated.130 
D. The Terezín Declaration 
Although the European Parliament had already passed a set of resolu-
tions regarding the restitution of looted property in the late 1990s,131 at 
the European Community level the restitution debate only took shape 
towards the end of 2003. On December 17, 2003, the European Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution endorsing a Parliamentary Committee report 
on a legal framework for free movement within the internal market of 
goods whose ownership is likely to be contested.132 In the resolution, the 
European Parliament called on the European Commission to undertake a 
study on the development of common principles regarding prescription 
and the establishment of ownership or title and possible dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms.133 In addition, the Presidency of the European Union 
was requested to assign the issue to a working group.134 However, all of 
Parliament’s suggestions were disregarded, as no further action was tak-
en at the European Community level until 2009.135 
On June 26, 2009, under the auspices of the European Union, the four-
day Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference set about its proceedings. 
On June 30, 2009, upon the invitation of the Czech government, the rep-
                                                                                                             
 128. Vilnius Forum Declaration, supra note 124, para. 5; see also LUBINA, supra note 
1, at 182 (internal quotations omitted); O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum, supra note 
119, at 130. 
 129. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 182; O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum, supra 
note 119, at 131–32. 
 130. See O’Keefe, Vilnius International Forum, supra note 119, at 130–32. 
 131. Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 638 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 (E.D. La. 2009). 
 132. Resolution on Freedom of Movement and Ownership of Goods, 2002/2114(INI), 
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resentatives of forty-six states met in Terezín to adopt the conclusive 
declaration.136 
However, with regard to the restitution of Nazi-confiscated cultural 
property,137 the Terezín Declaration paraded old ideas as new ones. The 
document solemnly reaffirmed the signatories’ support of the Washing-
ton Principles and encouraged all parties to apply them, yet did not actu-
ally further the cause of restitution.138 On the contrary, if there might 
have been some doubt about the normative value of the Terezín Declara-
tion and its predecessors, their precise purport is henceforth extremely 
clear. With regard to restitution of cultural heritage, the Terezín Declara-
tion only speaks in terms of “voluntary commitments” and “moral prin-
ciples.”139 In that connection it is noteworthy that the preamble to the 
Terezín Declaration even explicitly affirms the legally nonbinding nature 
of the declaration and the moral responsibilities expressed therein.140 
III. THE TENUOUSNESS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 
RESOLUTION OF NAZI ERA ART DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The preceding discussion serves as an indication of the international 
community’s affected preoccupation with the outstanding injustices of 
Nazi era spoliation. Chronological analysis reveals that none of the 
adopted instruments of public international law imposed any enforceable 
legal duty on the government of the signatory states, let alone any addi-
tional legal right for the victims of Nazi era spoliation. Accordingly, 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. at 484; see also Terezín Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related 
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 137. Unlike the 1998 Washington Conference, the 2009 Prague Conference did not 
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none of these instruments of public international law are self-executing 
international treaties, as the signatories lacked will to be bound.141 
However, this does not necessarily imply that these international prin-
ciples, resolutions, and declarations are devoid of all meaning. They may 
still be important factors in achieving—albeit indirectly—the objectives 
set by the international community when adopting these instruments of 
public international law. Nonbinding international agreements often trig-
ger pressure for compliance among the actors involved, give rise to ex-
pectations as to the outcome of legal proceedings, and accordingly give 
courts a push in a certain direction.142 In addition, they may serve as an 
inspiration or even justification for governmental action, leading to the 
implementation of domestic legislation.143 
Despite the potential for nonbinding international agreements to pro-
duce indirect legal effects, this Part argues that, as far as the actual set-
tlement of Holocaust-related art disputes in the United States is con-
cerned, the ambitious objectives of the various international agreements 
regarding Nazi-looted art have, for the greater part, not even been indi-
rectly met. In particular, the following analysis shows that, in Nazi era 
art litigation, arguments of public international law and corresponding 
domestic laws will not be of much help to heirs of original owners when 
trying to regain possession of looted belongings through U.S. court pro-
cedures. 
A. Failure to Implement the Core Elements of the International Frame-
work 
In response to the sudden upsurge in Holocaust-related title disputes, 
several members of the U.S. Congress passed a number of Holocaust-
related bills.144 A plethora of proposed legislation eventually resulted in 
three 1998 bills, which the 105th Congress passed even prior to the 
Washington Conference.145 
On February 2, 1998, President Clinton signed the Holocaust Victims 
Redress Act into law.146 The bill, which was sponsored by New York 
                                                                                                             
 141. See LUBINA, supra note 1, at 218–20. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 219. 
 144. Office of Cong. Relations, The 105th Congress and Holocaust-Related Litigation, 
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM (Dec. 23, 1998), 
http://www.ushmm.org/assets/legislation.htm. 
 145. Id.; see Falconer, supra note 19, at 400. 
 146. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998); see 
also Falconer, supra note 19, at 400; Lawrence M. Kaye, Looted Art: What Can and 
Should Be Done, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 666–67 (1998); Kreder, Resolving Nazi-
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Senator D’Amato, had multiple purposes and addressed both the issue of 
heirless assets and the problem of looted art in an attempt to “provide a 
measure of justice to survivors of the Holocaust all around the world 
while they are still alive.”147 Title I of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act 
authorized the President to appropriate up to twenty-five million dollars 
for distribution to charitable organizations that lend succor to Holocaust 
survivors and an additional five million dollars for archival research and 
translation services to assist in the restitution of assets looted or extorted 
from Holocaust victims.148 Title II expressed: 
[T]he sense of the Congress that consistent with the 1907 Hague Con-
vention, all governments should undertake good faith efforts to facili-
tate the return of private and public property, such as works of art, to 
the rightful owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the 
claimant during the period of Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof 
that the claimant is the rightful owner.149 
On June 23, 1998, President Clinton signed the United States Holo-
caust Assets Commission Act into law,150 which created the Presidential 
Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States.151 The 
Holocaust Assets Commission was established to conduct a thorough 
study and develop a historical record of the collection and disposition of 
Holocaust era assets in the United States before, during, and after 
WWII.152 The commission focused on a broad panoply of assets, such as 
money, gems, jewels, precious metals, bank accounts, insurance policies, 
real estate, works of art, books, manuscripts, and religious objects that 
came into the possession or control of the Federal Government at any 
time after January 30, 1933.153 On January 16, 2001, the commission 
submitted its final report to the President, making recommendations for 
                                                                                                             
Looted Art Disputes, supra note 51, at 174–75; McCarter Collins, supra note 15, at 143; 
Pell, supra note 64, at 46; Walton, supra note 26, at 605–06; Henson, supra note 62, at 
1155; Maples, supra note 103, at 382; Pollock, supra note 43, at 205. 
 147. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, § 101. 
 148. Id. § 103. 
 149. Id. § 202. 
 150. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186, 112 Stat. 
611 (1998). 
 151. Id. § 2. 
 152. Id. § 3. 
 153. Id. The independent commission was composed of twenty-one members. Id. 
Eight were private citizens, who had a record of demonstrated leadership on issues relat-
ing to the Holocaust or in the fields of commerce, culture, or education; four were repre-
sentatives of the Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of the 
Army, and the Department of the Treasury; another eight were Congressional Members 
from both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Id. 
148 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:1 
legislative, administrative, and other action.154 However, none of the 
commission’s recommendations have actually been adopted.155 
In October 1998, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act was passed, es-
tablishing the Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working 
Group.156 Its mission was to locate, identify, inventory, recommend for 
declassification, and make available to the public all classified Nazi war 
criminal records of the United States.157 Through this operation, Con-
gress aimed to acknowledge the atrocities of the Holocaust and bring 
justice to the survivors and their heirs.158 The Interagency Working 
Group coordinated the declassification and release of around eight mil-
lion pages of Holocaust-related records.159 
Unlike its predecessor, the 106th Congress (January 3, 1999 through 
January 3, 2001) was less effective than the preceding Congress in actu-
ally passing Holocaust-related legislation than introducing it.160 Of the 
numerous proposals, it only enacted a single one.161 The considerable 
amount of proposed legislation, however, demonstrates the 106th Con-
gress’s continued commitment to the resolution of the outstanding Holo-
caust injustices. Congressman Slaughter sponsored the Justice for Holo-
caust Survivors Act, which tried to add an exception to the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act162 allowing U.S. citizens who had suffered per-
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sonal injuries during WWII to sue Germany in federal court when they 
exhausted all remedies under German law. However, the proposal never 
made it through the legislature.163 Several propositions attempted to 
make amendments to the Internal Revenue Code by exempting Holo-
caust reparations from individual Federal income tax,164 by excluding 
from gross income “any amount received by an individual (or any heir of 
the individual) from any person as a result of any moral or legal injustice 
experienced by such individual as a Holocaust victim”165 or by prohibit-
ing deductions “for any payment under a foreign-based Holocaust vic-
tims’ settlement if no deduction would be allowed under such Code for 
such payment were it made directly by the foreign bank or other entity 
entering into such settlement.”166 However, none of these proposed bills 
were signed into law either.167 
B. The Imperviousness of U.S. Courts to Public International Law 
On August 20, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that the Terezín Declaration, expressing the U.S. policy on 
behalf of victims of Nazi era spoliation, does not preempt state property 
law.168 
The case arose out of an adverse ownership claim made by Dr. Claudia 
Seger-Thomschitz for a 1910 painting by Oskar Kokoschka, entitled Por-
trait of Youth (Hans Reichel).169 Dr. Seger-Thomschitz was the sole heir 
to the estate of Raimund Reichel, whose brother sat for the painting. It is 
maintained that Raimund’s father, Oskar Reichel, lost the Kokoschka 
portrait of Hans to the Nazis in 1939 when the regime forced Reichel to 
sell his art collection in Vienna, Austria, as he faced increasing Nazi per-
secution. Reichel transferred ownership of the portrait, along with four 
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other paintings,170 to Otto Kallir, an art dealer with a somewhat shady 
reputation for collaborating with the Nazis and taking advantage of the 
hardship inflicted on the Jewish art collectors in Austria.171 
Dr. Seger-Thomschitz found the painting in the possession of Sarah 
Dunbar, a Louisiana citizen, who inherited the painting from her mother 
in 1973.172 When Dunbar received a demand letter from Seger-
Thomschitz, she filed suit to quiet title to the painting based on her own-
ership by acquisitive prescription under Louisiana law and the fact that 
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Louisiana’s prescriptive laws barred Seger-Thomschitz’s claims.173 
Seger-Thomschitz, however, counterclaimed, arguing that Dunbar’s 
mother knew or should have known about the Reichel family’s previous 
ownership when she purchased the painting from Kallir’s New York gal-
lery in 1946, but deliberately chose to turn a blind eye to the looting of 
Jewish property that had occurred in Austria under Nazi reign.174 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Dunbar.175 The court held that Dunbar ob-
tained title by acquisitive prescription under Louisiana state law.176 After 
all, there was no material factual dispute that Dunbar’s possession of the 
painting was open and continuous for well over ten years, thus fulfilling 
the requirements to establish ownership by acquisitive prescription under 
Louisiana law.177 In addition, the court found Seger-Thomschitz’s coun-
terclaims time-barred by the applicable Louisiana prescriptive periods.178 
On appeal, Seger-Thomschitz did not “question that Louisiana pre-
scriptive laws were correctly applied.”179 Seger-Thomas reasoned that 
Louisiana law did not apply at all, as they conflicted with and must be 
preempted by the foreign policy of the Executive Branch, as most recent-
ly articulated in the Terezín Declaration.180 As discussed above, the Te-
rezín Declaration urges all signatory countries to ensure that their legal 
systems facilitate just and fair solutions regarding Nazi-confiscated and 
looted art, and to make certain that restitution claims are resolved expedi-
tiously based on their facts and merits.181 Accordingly, Seger-Thomschitz 
argued that applying Louisiana’s prescriptive laws would unconstitution-
ally intrude on the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. There-
fore, the policy represented by the Terezín Declaration should preempt 
Louisiana prescription periods because it expresses a preference to adju-
dicate claims for recovery of Nazi-confiscated artworks on their facts and 
merits.182 
The Fifth Circuit, however, found Seger-Thomschitz’s preemption 
theory untenable, holding that: 
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Nazi-loot-claim-rejected/18722. 
 179. Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 576. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See supra notes 131–40 and accompanying text. 
 182. See Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 578–79. 
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Louisiana has not pursued any policy specific to Holocaust victims or 
Nazi-confiscated artwork. The state’s prescription periods apply gener-
ally to any challenge of ownership to movable property. Louisiana’s 
laws are well within the realm of traditional state responsibilities. In 
exercising its strong interest in regulating the ownership of property 
within the state through these prescriptive laws, Louisiana has not in-
fringed on any exclusive federal powers. Indeed, the Terezín Declara-
tion itself contains language noting that “different legal traditions” 
should be taken into account. Appellant presents no proof that U.S. pol-
icy on behalf of Holocaust victims is committed to overriding generally 
applicable state property law. . . . Louisiana’s prescriptive laws are not 
preempted by the Terezín Declaration, U.S. foreign policy, or the Pres-
ident’s foreign affairs powers.183 
Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz illustrates the unwillingness among U.S. 
courts to incorporate public international law arguments in Holocaust-
related art decisions. The United States’ policy on behalf of victims of 
Nazi era spoliation, as expressed in the Washington Principles or the Te-
rezín and Vilnius Declarations, does not preempt the state rules on prop-
erty law, the Louisiana court briefly held. In Nazi era art disputes, U.S. 
courts have indeed not yet set aside state rules on property law and statu-
tory limitation, even if they were to conflict with the Executive Branch’s 
preference, as expressed at the international level, to adjudicate claims 
for recovery of Nazi-confiscated artwork on their facts and merits. Dun-
bar v. Seger-Thomschitz is indicative of the ease with which the Ameri-
can courts turn down claims for restitution of Holocaust artwork that are 
grounded on the above instruments of public international law. 
In addition to the denied direct effect of the aforementioned interna-
tional framework on Holocaust-related art litigation, it should be recalled 
that these sources of public international law also fail to achieve their 
objectives indirectly, as the U.S. Congress did not implement the core 
elements of these international agreements. 
C. The Ineffectiveness of Implemented Legislation for the Resolution of 
Title Disputes 
The previous section demonstrates federal legislation’s limited role in 
resolving restitution claims regarding Nazi-looted art. The little federal 
legislation that exists has a different focus: the Nazi War Crimes Disclo-
sure Act that made WWII criminal records public; the U.S. Holocaust 
Assets Commission Act that merely established the Presidential Adviso-
ry Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, which was lim-
                                                                                                             
 183. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted). 
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ited to studying the issue and making recommendations which Congress 
failed to adopt; and the Holocaust Victims Redress Act that set up a 
sponsorship for archival and translation services in addition to the finan-
cial aid it procured to organizations assisting Holocaust survivors in 
bringing claims. Indeed, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act did no more 
than encourage victims of Nazi-spoliation to come forward and make 
known their claims to confiscated art, without providing any specific 
remedy. 
In this connection, it is interesting to recall Dunbar and note the dis-
trict court’s considerations with regard to the Act. Whereas Seger-
Thomschitz argued before the Fifth Circuit that Louisiana prescriptive 
laws should not be applied at all as they were preempted by the Execu-
tive Branch’s foreign policy as articulated in the Terezín Declaration,184 
she maintained somewhat similar reasoning based on the Holocaust Vic-
tims Redress Act before the district court. She argued that “federal com-
mon law authority” should displace Louisiana law’s prescriptive periods 
with the federal doctrines of laches and unclean hands to enable claims to 
recover Nazi-confiscated artworks to be decided on their substantive 
merit.185 Accordingly, Seger-Thomschitz asserted that the Louisiana pre-
scription laws should be supplanted with “federal common law” to en-
sure the goals of the federal Holocaust Victims Redress Act.186 However, 
the district court found this assertion “problematic”187 for a number of 
reasons. 
First the district court held that the Holocaust Victims Redress Act did 
not create a “federal common law” cause of action.188 In that connection, 
the court recalled that in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided that Congress lacked the power to declare sub-
stantive rules of common law applicable to a state whether they were 
general, commercial law, or part of the law of torts.189 In addition, “no 
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the fed-
eral courts.”190 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also dedicated some thoughts 
to Seger-Thomschitz’s theory of “federal common law”: 
                                                                                                             
 184. See Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 576–77. 
 185. Id. at 576. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Dunbar, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 664–65 (“Defendant’s assertion that this court may 
supplant Louisiana prescription laws in order to ensure the goals of the Holocaust Vic-
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 188. Id. at 664. 
 189. Id. (discussing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 
1188 (1938)). 
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[A]s this case is brought under federal diversity jurisdiction, the appli-
cation of state statutory limitations periods is controlled by Erie. With 
regard to fashioning federal common law, the Supreme Court has held: 
[“]The vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of it-
self give rise to authority to formulate federal common law, nor does 
the existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal 
courts are free to develop a common law to govern those areas until 
Congress acts. Rather, absent some congressional authorization to for-
mulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in 
such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of 
the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the 
conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and 
admiralty cases. In these instances, our federal system does not permit 
the controversy to be resolved under state law, either because the au-
thority and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately in-
volved or because the interstate or international nature of the controver-
sy makes it inappropriate for state law to control.[“]191 
Second, the district court held that “the Holocaust Victim’s Redress 
Act was not intended to give individuals a private cause of action.”192 On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed this holding, finding that “no Act of 
Congress has articulated ‘rights and obligations of the United States’ in 
regard to these claims; even the [Holocaust Victims Redress Act] creates 
no individual cause of action.”193 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Orkin v. Taylor held that “[t]he plain 
text of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act leaves little doubt that Con-
gress did not intend to create a private right of action.”194 The case re-
volved around Elizabeth Taylor’s complaint for declaratory relief to es-
tablish her title to a van Gogh painting, entitled Vue de l’Asile et de la 
Chapelle de Saint-Remy.195 The District Court for the Central District of 
                                                                                                             
 191. Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 577 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 
451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981)) (internal citations omitted). 
 192. Dunbar, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 193. Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 577 (quoting Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 
2007)). 
 194. Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’g sub nom. Adler v. Tay-
lor, No. 04-8472-RGK (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5862 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005). 
 195. In the 1930s, the painting belonged to Margarete Mauthner, an early collector of 
van Gogh’s works. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 736. Yet, Mauthner was Jewish and, as the Nazis’ 
persecution accelerated, she fled Germany to South Africa in 1939, leaving her posses-
sions behind. Id. at 737. What transpired with the painting during the 1930s in Berlin is 
clouded in uncertainty and disputed between the parties. Id. The descendants of Mauthner 
claim that their ancestor was wrongfully dispossessed of the painting, alleging economic 
coercion and contending that Mauthner sold the painting “under duress.” Id. They note 
that Military Government Law No. 59, Restitution of Identifiable Property, MIL. GOV. 
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California found for Taylor, concluding that the state law actions were 
time-barred and that the federal statute did not create a private right of 
action.196 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district 
court.197 Based on Cort v. Ash, in which the Supreme Court set out its 
four-factor test for discerning whether a statute creates a private right of 
action,198 the court dismissed the claim the Orkins thought to derive from 
                                                                                                             
GAZ. (U.S. Zone) (Nov. 10, 1947), promulgated by the Allied Forces after the conclusion 
of WWII, established a presumption that any transfer or relinquishment of property by a 
persecuted person within the period January 30, 1933 to May 8, 1945 was an act of con-
fiscation. Id. Taylor, on the other hand, contends that, at best, the record shows that 
through a number of consecutive sales the painting ended up in the possession of Alfred 
Wolf, with no evidence of any Nazi coercion or participation in the transactions. Id. 
Sometime in the early 1960s, the Estate of Alfred Wolf commissioned Sotheby’s to sell 
by auction a number of Impressionist and Post-Impressionist paintings, including Vue de 
l’Asile et de la Chapelle de Saint-Remy. Id. With the help of her father, whom she author-
ized to bid for her, Elizabeth Taylor acquired the van Gogh at Sotheby’s London for 
£92,000. Id. Taylor’s acquisition was much discussed in the media at the time. Id. In 
addition, a 1970 catalogue raisonné referenced Taylor’s ownership, and from November 
1986 until March 1987, the painting was exhibited publicly in a blockbuster exhibition at 
the Metropolitan in New York. Id. In 1990, Taylor offered the painting for sale through 
Christie’s, London, but the painting did not sell. Id. at 737–38. The Orkins contend not to 
have discovered the basis of their claim before 2001, when they retained a law firm to do 
investigations into the hardship that was inflicted on their ancestors as a result of Nazi 
persecution. Id. at 738. They also claim that they first learned of Taylor’s ownership in 
2002 through a rumor on the internet that Taylor was interested in selling the painting. Id. 
In December 2003, the Orkins wrote a letter to Taylor, demanding that she return the 
painting to them. Id. After some discussion of settlement, Taylor wrote a response letter 
declining settlement and asserting that the Orkins’ claim to the painting was untimely. Id. 
Taylor then filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish her title. Id. For more 
details on the factual background of the case, see Matthew Batters & Sharon Flescher, Liz 
Taylor Seeks Court’s Aid in Holocaust Claim, 7 IFAR J., no. 1, 2004 at 6–7; Lauren 
Fielder Redman, Case Note, Orkin v. Taylor—A Satisfying Solution to a Dispute over a 
Van Gogh or a Blow for Holocaust Art Restitution Claims in United States Federal 
Court?, 12 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 389 (2007) (U.K.); Reiss & Bloom, supra note 77, at 
14–18; see also Carla J. Shapreau, Nazi-era Restitution Lawsuits – New Developments in 
the California Courts, 10 IFAR J., no. 2, 2008 at 28–29; Linda Greenhouse, Elizabeth 
Taylor to Keep Van Gogh, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at E2. 
 196. Adler v. Taylor, No. 04-8472-RGK (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5862, at 
*13–16, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005). 
 197. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 736. 
 198. In Cort v. Ash, the United States Supreme Court held: 
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly 
providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff “one of the 
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,” that is, does the stat-
ute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or 
156 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:1 
the Holocaust Victims Redress Act.199 The Orkins relied on §202 of the 
Act, which states that 
[i]t is the sense of the Congress that consistent with the 1907 Hague 
Convention, all governments should undertake good faith efforts to fa-
cilitate the return of private and public property, such as works of art, to 
the rightful owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the 
claimant during the period of Nazi-rule and there is reasonable proof 
that the claimant is the rightful owner.200 
However, with regard to this provision the Ninth Circuit held: 
“Sense of the Congress” provisions are precatory provisions, which do 
not in themselves create individual rights or, for that matter, any en-
forceable law. Although “sense of the Congress” provisions are some-
times relevant to our determination of whether other mandatory provi-
sions create private rights of action, the Orkins can point to no provi-
sion of the Act or of any of its companion legislation that can fairly be 
characterized as mandatory. There is simply no “right- or duty-creating 
language” anywhere in the statutory scheme and § 202’s announcement 
of a “sense of the Congress” cannot, of its own force, imply a private 
right of action.201 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that the Act’s legislative history 
indicated that “even its most ardent supporter did not intend for the bill 
to create a private right of action. Rather, the legislative intent was to 
encourage state and foreign governments to enforce existing rights for 
the protection of Holocaust victims.”202 Indeed, the court observed that 
“[t]he sponsor and primary champion of the legislation, Representative 
Jim Leach believed that existing law would suffice to restitute Nazi-
stolen artworks to their wartime owners.”203 At his hearing before the 
House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, Leach noted the 
possibility that new “domestic legislation” might assist in the restitution 
of stolen art, but he went on to conclude that “Congress may have gone 
                                                                                                             
to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause 
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action 
based solely on federal law? 
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 199. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 740–41. 
 200. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112 Stat. 15, 17-18 
(1998). 
 201. Orkin, 487 F.3d at 739 (internal citation omitted). 
 202. Id. at 739. 
 203. Id. 
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as far as it appropriately should on this subject in the Holocaust Victims 
Redress Act.”204 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit went on to hold that the motivating 
concern for the legislation was not access to courts, but rather, access to 
information. 
[T]he text and history of the legislation reveal that its overarching pur-
pose was not to provide for private litigation. Rather, the general pur-
pose of the statutory scheme was to fund research efforts and to declas-
sify records, while simultaneously encouraging foreign governments, as 
well as public and private institutions, to do likewise.205 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that there could be “no doubt . . . that 
state law provides causes of action for restitution of stolen artwork” and 
that “implication of a federal remedy” would therefore be improper.206 
The decisions in Dunbar and Orkin perfectly illustrate that, despite 
federal legislation regarding Nazi confiscations, not even the Holocaust 
Victims Redress Act provides any specific remedy to reclaim stolen 
property. Indeed, actions in replevin are a quintessential area of state re-
sponsibility. In that connection, it is noteworthy that in Alperin v. Vati-
can Bank, the Ninth Circuit stated that for victims of Nazi era lootings to 
seek the return of their lost possessions, a private lawsuit is “the only 
game in town.”207 In these cases, the United States courts consistently 
apply state statutes of limitations, as the issue of restitution of stolen 
property is regulated by the states.208 
In response to the upsurge in Holocaust-related claims and the adop-
tion of the 1998 Washington Principles, no U.S. state, except California, 
has amended its limitation rules for actions in replevin regarding Nazi 
era confiscated cultural property. Consequently, as far as the actual reso-
lution of Nazi era art claims is concerned, it was not only the United 
States Congress that failed to implement the core elements of the interna-
tional agreements of Washington, Vilnius, and Terezín; the same is true 
                                                                                                             
 204. Id. (quoting Holocaust Victims’ Claims, Hearing Before the House committee on 
Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998)). 
 205. Id. at 740. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 558 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 208. For further discussion of cases in New York, see Bert Demarsin, Has the Time (of 
Laches) Come? – Recent Nazi-Era Art Litigation in the New York Forum, 59 BUFF. L. 
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for the state legislatures, which is particularly relevant in view of their 
traditional competence to regulate actions in replevin and conversion 
regarding stolen property. 
However, in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art,209the Ninth 
Circuit found California’s amendment of the limitation rules in favor of 
Holocaust victims unconstitutional, as the provision infringed on the na-
tional government’s exclusive foreign affairs powers.210 It is surprising 
that the only statute that actually implemented the ideas of the 1998 
Washington Principles was struck down for professed unconstitutionali-
ty.211 As other states have passed upon the opportunity to implement leg-
islation nationwide, it is unclear if all state statutes would be similarly 
stricken.212 
D. The Private Law Status of Leading American Art Museums 
At the 1998 Washington Conference, the United States set itself up as 
the great champion of ethical standards in the art and museum world and 
protective measures for the victims of Nazi era art looting.213 The Wash-
                                                                                                             
 209. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 210. Id. at 967–68. 
 211. For some critical comments on the decision of the Ninth Circuit, see Case Com-
ment, Constitutional Law – Federal Preemption of State Law – Ninth Circuit Strikes 
Down California Law Extending Statute of Limitations for the Recovery of Holocaust-
Era Artwork – Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 07-56691, 
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 213. The United States’ self-proclaimed leadership on restitution matters is implicit in 
Ambassador Eizenstat’s speeches at the Washington Conference. See Stuart E. Eizenstat, 
Explanation of the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, in 
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after Eizenstat, Explanation of the Washington Conference Principles]. From Ambassa-
dor Eizenstat’s words, the United States seemed to hold its efforts toward restitution in 
high regard: 
The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration has placed its finding 
aid to Holocaust-era art on the Internet. We encourage all governments, muse-
ums, art dealers and other institutions to join in this effort. 
Id. The United States’ self-established leadership on asset restitution issues is also clear 
from the report of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets. See 
PLUNDER & RESTITUTION, supra note 55; see also EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE, supra 
note 13, at 185–204 (outlining his central role as U.S. official in the art restitution pro-
cess). 
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ington Conference was a U.S.-led initiative intended to procure interna-
tional endorsement of the AAMD report.214 It was U.S. Ambassador to 
the European Union, Stuart Eizenstat, who brought up the art restitution 
issue at the 1997 London Conference on Nazi Gold and later prepared 
and spearheaded the agreement’s negotiations at the Washington Confer-
ence.215 However, during the negotiations, it soon became clear that key 
countries in Europe displayed somewhat greater reticence to adopting the 
Washington Principles, as they worried that American principles, over-
riding their civil law judicial processes, were to be imposed upon their 
museums.216 Europe’s greater reluctance was understandable, as moral 
agreements of public international law such as the Washington Principles 
would still be seen as obliging all governmental branches, including the 
leading European art museums, which are all state-owned. 
Compared to the European situation, the United States is undeniably in 
a more comfortable position, as the country’s commitment per the Prin-
ciples was significantly smaller than its European peers.217 Indeed, lead-
ing museums in the United States are not federal governmental agencies; 
instead they are mainly private or state and municipal institutions.218 As 
such, they are third parties to any commitment assumed by the Executive 
Branch. Consequently, while the federal government may be bound by 
the Washington Principles, the Metropolitan Museum is not.219 Nor are 
other world-class institutions, such as the Art Institute of Chicago, the 
Museums of Fine Arts of Boston and Houston, the Guggenheim and Get-
ty Museums, and the Museums of Modern Art of New York and San 
Francisco. In that connection, it is noteworthy that the State Depart-
ment’s Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Ambassador J. Christian 
Kennedy, emphasized the federal government’s limited role in actually 
resolving restitution claims regarding Nazi-looted art.220 In his Potsdam 
speech of April 23, 2007, Ambassador Kennedy observed: 
 
                                                                                                             
 214. See supra note 67. 
 215. See KURTZ, AMERICA & NAZI CONTRABAND, supra note 14, at 217; Kreder, Re-
solving Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, supra note 51, at 158. 
 216. KURTZ, AMERICA & NAZI CONTRABAND, supra note 14, at 218; EIZENSTAT, 
IMPERFECT JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 193–94, 198. 
 217. Some criticized the Washington Principles for mainly serving U.S. interests by 
safeguarding the lucrative U.S. art market from troublesome litigation. See KURTZ, 
AMERICA & NAZI CONTRABAND, supra note 14, at 219. 
 218. Range, supra note 69, at 669; Sawka, supra note 76, at 106–07. 
 219. Range, supra note 69, at 669. 
 220. Mullery, supra note 18, at 654–55. 
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[A]rt restitution in [the United States] has generally involved a private 
citizen who discovers that an artwork once held by his or her family is 
now hanging in a museum or private collection . . . . While the gov-
ernment can urge institutions to participate voluntarily in programs . . . 
the government does not have any leverage to force compliance, for 
one simple reason: With the exception of a few federally owned and 
operated institutions, museums in the United States tend to be owned 
and operated privately, or by state or municipal authorities. This leaves 
no specific role for the federal government in the art restitution process 
. . . . The point that I want to make with you today is the following. The 
role of the United States Government in art restitution matters is signif-
icantly different from the role of many European governments. Our 
government has not been involved in cases such as those adjudicated by 
the Dutch Art Restitution Commission, nor has it been involved in di-
rect negotiations with other states as have some European countries.221 
Although most American art museums are no different from private 
individuals as far as their obligation under the aforementioned interna-
tional agreements is concerned, it might be argued that they still assume 
a somewhat special position. After all, unlike private citizens, these art 
museums have adopted the AAM and AAMD Guidelines to assist them 
in addressing issues raised by holding Nazi era looted artworks in their 
collections.222 Similar to the Terezín Declaration or the Washington Prin-
ciples, these guidelines aim at resolving title claims to Nazi era looted art 
“in an equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable manner.”223 In that 
connection, the AAM Guidelines even specify that “in order to achieve 
an equitable and appropriate resolution of claims, museums may elect to 
waive certain available defenses,”224 most notably those based on statuto-
ry limitation and laches. 
However, in practice, these Guidelines do not seem to prevent leading 
American art museums from raising technical defenses if such might al-
low museums to retain possession of Nazi era looted pieces. In recent 
years, art museums have become increasingly aggressive in filing declar-
atory judgment actions to quiet title, instead of relying on mediation pro-
cedures, which the AAM Guidelines, Washington Principles, and Te-
                                                                                                             
 221. J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. Diplomatic Mis-
sion to Ger., Remarks at University of Potsdam’s Moses-Mendelssohn Center for Euro-
pean-Jewish Studies Conference: The Role of the United States Government in Art Resti-
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 222. See Unlawful Appropriation Guidelines, supra note 67. 
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 224. Id.; see also Sawka, supra note 76, at 109. 
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rezín Declaration each state as the preferred way to resolve Holocaust-
related art claims.225 
In Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin,226 the museum was the first to file 
suit regarding a painting by Paul Gauguin, seeking declaratory relief 
based on Ohio’s statute of limitations.227 The museum argued that Mar-
tha Nathan, the Jewish prior owner of the Gauguin painting, sold the 
work voluntarily and at a fair price in 1938. However, the Nathan heirs 
contended that the paintings were sold under duress.228 Toledo Museum 
is not only worthy of mention because of the museum’s proactive ap-
proach of filing a declaratory judgment action and seeking a permanent 
injunction; it also illustrates that the museum did not feel in any way re-
stricted or obliged under the aforementioned AAM guidelines. The heirs 
of Nathan, on the other hand, notably argued that, by endorsing the AAM 
Guidelines, the Toledo Museum voluntarily waived its statute of limita-
tions defense.229 The district court, however, found for the Toledo Muse-
um, holding that according to Ohio law, the heirs’ title claims were time-
barred well before their filing in 2006.230 With regard to the defendant’s 
primary argument that the museum had voluntarily relinquished statute 
of limitations and laches defenses when it adopted the AAM Guidelines, 
the district court held: 
The Guidelines were not intended to create legal obligations or manda-
tory rules but rather were intended to “facilitate the ability of museums 
to act ethically and legally as stewards” through “serious efforts” on a 
“case by case basis.” The Guidelines are “intended to assist museums 
in addressing issues relating to objects that may have been unlawfully 
appropriated during the Nazi era,” but should not be interpreted to 
place an undue burden on the museums.231 
                                                                                                             
 225. Kreder, Ethics Revolution in U.S. Museums, supra note 79, at 1023; Kreder, New 
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 231. Id. at 809 (internal citations omitted); see also Graefe, supra note 22, at 506. 
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In Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin,232 the Michigan District Court 
found for the museum on similar grounds. The matter arose out of a dis-
pute as to the ownership of a painting by Vincent van Gogh, entitled Les 
Becheurs. As in Toledo Museum, the van Gogh painting also belonged to 
Martha Nathan. In Detroit Institute of Arts, again the museum filed a de-
claratory judgment action first.233 The district court held that the heirs’ 
title claims were time-barred under Michigan law.234 With regard to the 
heirs’ argument that the museum had voluntarily waived its statute of 
limitations defense by adopting the AAM Guidelines, the court observed 
that, although the AAM Guidelines state that museums may elect to 
waive certain available defenses in order to achieve an equitable and ap-
propriate resolution of claims, the Detroit Institute of Arts clearly ex-
pressed its choice not to do so by initiating the instant quiet title action.235 
Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps236 concerns another recent action 
for declaratory judgment, brought by two leading New York museums.237 
The dispute revolved around two celebrated Picasso paintings, Boy Lead-
ing a Horse, part of the permanent MoMA collection, and Le Moulin de 
la Galette, a main attraction of the Guggenheim Foundation. At one time, 
the two paintings belonged to the private collection of Paul von Men-
delssohn-Bartholdy, a prominent Jewish banker and art collector who 
lived in Berlin during the Nazis’ rise to power.238 Around the time of von 
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s death in 1935, the paintings were sold to 
Thannhauser, a Berlin art dealer, who sold Boy Leading a Horse to Wil-
liam S. Paley in 1936.239 Thannhauser himself donated Moulin de la 
Galette to the Guggenheim Foundation in 1963, and Paley donated Boy 
Leading a Horse to MoMA in 1964.240 In 2007, Schoeps, the grandneph-
ew of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, sent letters to both museums, stating 
that the paintings were sold under duress and accordingly demanded their 
return.241 In response, the museums promptly initiated an action for de-
claratory relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
                                                                                                             
 232. Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28364, at 
*2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007). 
 233. Id. at *2. 
 234. Id. at *8–11. 
 235. Id. at *11–12. 
 236. Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), later 
proceeding at, 594 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), request denied by, 599 F. Supp. 2d 
532 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), later proceeding at, 603 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 237. Id. at 543. 
 238. Id. at 544. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 544–45. 
 241. Id. at 545. 
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York seeking quiet title to the paintings and alleging an attempt to use 
the façade of Nazi-iniquities to extort monies from honorable institutions 
that were vulnerable to bad publicity.242 
Along with the cases previously discussed—such as Dunbar v. Seger-
Thomschitz,243 Museum of Fine Arts v. Seger-Thomschitz,244 Orkin v. 
Taylor,245 Detroit Institute of Arts v. Ullin246 and Toledo Museum of Art 
v. Ullin247—the Schoeps case illustrates the shift in mentality that oc-
curred among individuals and institutions in possession of artwork that 
changed hands under Nazi dominion. In little more than a decade, U.S. 
museums had “turned away from the spirit of 1998.”248 The dismay, or 
perhaps even shame, and corollary obligingness of the late 1990s that 
propelled many of the first cases to settlement249 quickly evolved into 
dogged defense of ownership among current possessors. 
The Washington Principles and Terezín Declaration failed to lead to 
mutually negotiated and agreed solutions for Holocaust related title dis-
putes.250 Instead, in recent years, U.S. museums freely broke up ongoing 
negotiations and initiated court proceedings, despite possible agreement. 
The MoMA case is an unfortunate example of U.S. museums’ stubborn-
ness when confronted with possible claims for restitution.251 This is es-
pecially harsh due to the fact that the parties announced that they reached 
a settlement on February 2, 2009, the morning that trial was to com-
mence after a year of negotiations.252 Solution seemed at hand, as for a 
sum “which was to remain confidential under the settlement agreement, 
there would be complete peace between the parties and the paintings 
would remain with the museums.”253 However, the Museums immediate-
                                                                                                             
 242. Id.; see also Schoeps v. Museum of Modern Art, 603 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 243. See supra notes 168–83 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra notes 194–206 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 234–35 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
 248. Kreder, Ethics Revolution in U.S. Museums, supra note 79, at 1023. 
 249. See infra notes 357–63 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Kreder, New Battleground, supra note 170, at 46, 61–75; LUBINA, supra note 
1, at 184–85; see, e.g., Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 578–79. 
 251. See Kreder, New Battleground, supra note 170, at 46, 61–75. 
 252. Schoeps, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 674. 
 253. Id. at 674 (internal quotations omitted). Judge Rakoff severely criticized the con-
fidentiality of the agreement, stating: “The Court finds the confidentiality provision of the 
settlement agreement and the plaintiffs’ objection to disclosure to be against the public 
interest and a troubling reversal of the parties’ previously stated positions on this issue.” 
Id. at 675. The museums agreed to make the terms of the settlement public, but the heirs 
refused to waive the confidentiality provision. Id. at 674–75. Judge Rakoff called their 
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ly filed a declaratory judgment action, inflicting unnecessary litigation 
costs upon the heirs of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. 
Finally, the furtive position recently taken by MoMA in Grosz v. Mu-
seum of Modern Art254 is perhaps even more startling. The case regarded 
an action brought by the son and daughter-in-law of the German artist 
George Grosz, who was forced to flee his country in the wake of Hitler’s 
rise to power in 1933.255 In March 1938, Grosz saw his remaining Ger-
man assets confiscated and his citizenship revoked, as the Third Reich 
rendered him “stateless” by branding him an “enemy of the state.”256 The 
heirs’ action in replevin related to three caricatural paintings: Hermann-
Neisse with Cognac, Self-Portrait with Model, and Republican Automa-
tons, “which [were] alleged to have fallen prey to [indirect] Nazi looting 
. . . in the years between Grosz’s emigration from Germany in 1933 and 
the official confiscation of his assets in 1938.”257 Specifically, the Grosz 
heirs contended that MoMA wrongfully held all three paintings, which 
entered the museum collection either by donation or sale in the late 
1940s or early 1950s.258 
On December 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the Southern District of New York that dis-
missed the challenge to the museum’s ownership of the three prized 
works.259 It was not so much the mere dismissal of the heirs’ title 
claims260—after all, the painting’s wartime provenance is not unequivo-
cal as the Nazi-looting occurred indirectly261—but rather the grounds the 
court stated for this decision that were greeted with indignation.262 In 
                                                                                                             
motives to be “no more compelling than concealing the amount of money going into their 
pockets.” Id. at 675. However, the judge had no choice but to preserve the confidentiality 
of the settlement agreement, based on the Second Circuit’s decision in Glens Falls News-
papers. See United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 857 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 254. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 
10-257-cv), 2010 WL 2601991, at *1, reconsideration denied by, motion denied by, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20248 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d 403 Fed. App’x 575 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. 478–81 (describing in detail how the museum wrongfully obtained the 
paintings). 
 259. Grosz, 403 Fed. App’x at 578. 
 260. Brief for Am. Jewish Congress, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellants, Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 476, 477 (No. 10-257-cv) [hereinafter Am. Jewish 
Congress Amici Curiae Brief]. 
 261. Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 478–81. 
 262. One can tell the degree of indignation from the impressive list of Jewish commu-
nity leaders and organizations, Holocaust educators, artists, art historians, and legal 
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spite of the policy goals embedded in the Washington, Vilnius, and Te-
rezín agreements to effectively resolve Nazi era title disputes on the mer-
its, rather than by reliance on technical or procedural legal defenses, both 
the Second Circuit and the Southern District of New York dismissed the 
claim on limitation grounds.263 
The most troubling aspect of the Grosz case, however, was MoMA’s 
conduct of engaging in extended negotiations with a hidden agenda of 
exploiting the additional passage of time for limitation purposes.264 Ac-
cordingly, the museum’s conduct “[made] a mockery of any serious ne-
gotiation over disputed title to an artwork.”265 To add to the heirs’ mis-
fortune, the district court did not object to this underhandedness, as it 
inferred an earlier—albeit implicit—demand and refusal from the par-
ties’ correspondence, so as to frustrate the action in replevin the Grosz 
heirs clearly regarded timely.266 Grosz is yet another instance of institu-
tional apathy within the United States to the very changes it zealously 
sought internationally. 
IV. ART RESTITUTION: THE TALE OF A TWO-SPEED EUROPE 
The progress of the body of international agreements concerning Nazi-
looted art in the United States with regard to the actual settlement of 
Holocaust-related art disputes has been disappointedly paltry. The United 
States’ policy on behalf of victims of Nazi era spoliation, as expressed in 
the Washington Principles or the Terezín and Vilnius Declarations, does 
not preempt state property law. In addition, the suggested international 
framework has not been implemented, and the predominantly private 
museums in the United States do not consider themselves bound by the 
political engagements of the Executive Branch. The above analysis con-
trasts sharply with the United States’ proclaimed support of restitution 
efforts that continues to echo strongly through official speeches and ad-
dresses of state department officials.267 Moreover, the United States re-
                                                                                                             
scholars, all subscribing to the Amicus Brief filed in support of the Grosz heirs. See Am. 
Jewish Congress Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 260, at 11. 
 263. Grosz, 403 Fed. App’x at 577–789. 
 264. See Demarsin, Has the Time (of Laches) Come?, supra note 208, at 665–71. 
 265. See Am. Jewish Congress Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 260, at 11. 
 266. Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 483–88 (determining the time of the plaintiff’s demand 
and the museum’s refusal); see Demarsin, Has the Time (of Laches) Come?, supra note 
208, at 665–71. 
 267. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 221; Ambassador Edward O’Donnell, U.S. Special 
Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Claims Conference 
Bd. of Directors (July 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.claimscon.org/index.asp?url=news/board_07-11-06; see also Mullery, supra 
note 18, at 650, 654. 
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peatedly denounces other countries’ failure to follow the Washington 
Principles,268 incite others to assume their responsibilities,269 or pedanti-
cally calls on the European countries “to take a greater leadership role on 
Holocaust issues.”270 
As the majority of European countries participated in the Washington, 
Vilnius, and Terezín Declarations, it is interesting to compare the situa-
tion of the United States with Europe, particularly given the old conti-
nent’s history as the battleground of Nazi-spoliation and home to world-
class museums. Therefore, Part IV examines the response of European 
countries and compares the American lip service to the art spoliation de-
bate with the often-denounced European reticence regarding the restitu-
tion of stolen artworks.271 To a considerable extent, that criticism is justi-
                                                                                                             
 268. Mullery, supra note 18, at 655–56; see also Stuart E. Eizenstat, Head of U.S. 
Delegation to the Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conferences, Opening Plenary Session 
Remarks at Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference (June 28, 2009) [hereinafter Eizen-
stat, Opening Remarks], available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/126158.htm 
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 269. At the Washington conference, Eizenstat noticeably only emphasized the need for 
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418. 
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Conference, Closing Plenary Session Remarks at Prague Holocaust Era Assets Confer-
ence (June 29, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2009/126155.htm. 
 271. See, e.g., Eizenstat, Explanation of the Washington Conference Principles, supra 
note 213, at 418; see also Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance and Resolution of Cultural 
Heritage Disputes: Recovery of Art Looted during the Holocaust, 14 WILLAMETTE J. 
INT’L L. & DIS. RES. 243, 260–61 (2006); Weiss, supra note 15, at 873. For a more gen-
eral denunciation of the civil law protection of the bona fide purchaser in stolen art litiga-
tion, see, for example, Steven A. Bibas, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for 
Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2452–53, 2460 (1994); Karen Theresa Burke, Interna-
tional Transfers of Stolen Cultural Property: Should Thieves Continue to Benefit from 
Domestic Laws Favoring Bona Fide Purchasers?, 13 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 427, 
463 (1990); Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery 
Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1441–44 
(1992); Lee Ann Houseman, Comment, Current Practices and Problems in Combatting 
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fied, as the following analysis shows that many European countries also 
failed to implement the aforementioned international framework and re-
peatedly deny restitution on technical/procedural grounds. However, the 
European situation requires further scrutiny, because—generally speak-
ing—countries such as Austria, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands have demonstrably put in more serious effort to car-
ry out the international agenda. The analysis reveals that the United 
States’ call upon the European politicians to take a leadership role on 
Holocaust issues is not only unsuitable given its own limited restitutional 
efforts, but also inaccurate taking into account the serious restitutional 
efforts displayed in a number of Western European countries. 
A. Eastern and Southern European Obstruction or Noncompliance with 
International Agreements 
In spite of apparently broad consensus regarding the restitution of spo-
liated artworks, the majority of European countries that participated in 
the intergovernmental conferences and resolutions failed to adopt any 
legislation organizing systematic provenance research, let alone actual 
restitution procedures. This is particularly true for Eastern and Southern 
European countries, but less so for those in Western Europe. 
In Poland, for instance, the Washington Principles have only been used 
by the authorities to reclaim the country’s own cultural losses,272 despite 
                                                                                                             
Illegality in the Art Market, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 506, 538 (1982); Michele Kunitz, 
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& BUS. 519, 541 (2001). 
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ASSETS CONF. PROC. (June 26–30, 2009), 
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Looted Paintings From Christie’s and Doyle Auction Houses, ARTINFO (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/36653/poland-seizes-nazi-looted-paintings-from-
christies-and-doyle-auction-houses; Charles A. Goldstein, Counsel, Herrick Feinstein 
(N.Y.), Address at  the Restitution of Holocaust-Era Looted Art — The Washington Con-
ference (1998): An Overview 2 (May 8–9, 2009), available at 
http://www.comartrecovery.org/sites/default/files/docs/MALAGA_LECTUREfinalMAY
2009.pdf; Joe Milicia, Poland Renews Claim to Looted Art, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 31, 
2005), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20050131&slug=lootedart31. 
For more on a potential Polish restitution claim regarding a painting by Alexander 
Gierymski that disappeared from the National Museum in Warsaw in 1944, see Nazi 
Looted Painting Examined, THENEWS.PL (July 12, 2010, 5:02 PM), 
http://thenews.pl/1/11/Artykul/8623,Nazi-looted-painting-examined. 
168 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:1 
the return of stolen artwork to Polish claimants.273 However, there are 
clear indications that Polish institutions do hold Nazi-looted cultural as-
sets, as during WWII the Nazis used closed Polish museum facilities and 
libraries as repositories for works of art from Jewish communities in oc-
cupied territories.274 The lack of legislation establishing restitution pro-
cedures of spoliated personal property means there is not a single report-
ed case of restitution from Polish institutions.275 Consequently, at the 
Terezín Conference, Poland was criticized for not having made any 
headway in actually restituting looted objects to the heirs of wartime 
owners.276 Other Eastern European countries ravaged by the Holocaust, 
such as Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are 
equally reported not to have made significant progress towards imple-
mentation of the Washington Principles.277 
In Hungary, the situation is even worse, as the country is “outright[ly] 
hostil[e]” to restitution claims.278 Instead of confronting its past as a Nazi 
ally, Hungary closed itself as it barricaded its renowned collections, dis-
owning its international obligations.279 However, the government’s ac-
quaintance with the international framework is remarkably profound, 
particularly when it makes aggressive claims of its own for art objects 
displaced from Hungary during WWII and its aftermath.280 Hungary is 
stonewalling; it lacks any established restitution procedure, any specific 
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supra note 2, at 155–56. 
 279. One rare exception is the return of four paintings from the Szépmûvészeti (Hun-
garian Fine Arts Museum) to the heirs of Jeno Vida. See Resolved Stolen Art Claims, 
HERRICK, FEINSTEIN LLP 12, 
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C2.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Resolved Art Claims]. 
 280. Peresztegi, supra note 278, at 1. 
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legislation, and any effective judicial recourse.281 Hence, at the Terezín 
Conference, the Hungarian experience was described as 
a total and concerted effort by successive governments to keep the loot-
ed art in their museums even if it requires that (i) the museums conceal 
or destroy archival evidence, (ii) government officials deliberately 
lengthen negotiations, effectively delaying legal actions that would be 
filed against the state, and (iii) pressure is brought to bear on the courts 
through the media to render judgments that effectively renationalize 
these artworks.282 
Also in Southern Europe, little progress has been made towards im-
plementing the Washington Principles. It was reported at the 2009 Te-
rezín Conference that since 1998, neither the Balkan countries, nor Bul-
garia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, or Spain engaged in systematic provenance 
research of their museum collections.283 Most commonly, these countries 
equally lack specific legislation for the restitution of looted artwork.284 
Given the countries’ reservations toward providing provenance infor-
mation, their obstruction when faced with actual restitution claims is un-
surprising.285 
The above concise overview indicates that, contrary to their interna-
tional political commitment under the Washington, Vilnius and Terezín 
agreements, a large majority of the European countries have not put in 
place any mechanism for systematic provenance research and restitution 
of Nazi-looted art.286 As far as the above countries are concerned, the net 
effect of the body of international agreements concerning Nazi-looted art 
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seems almost inappreciable. It would appear, therefore, that the United 
States’ criticism of the European non-compliance with the international 
framework is perfectly justified,287 in view of the country’s substantial 
realizations in the field of provenance research.288 However, other Euro-
pean countries pay significantly better heed to implementing their com-
mitments under the international art restitution agreements. 
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Western Europe 
Unlike Eastern and Southern Europe, nearly all the Western European 
countries implemented various policies and programs in an effort to aid 
restitution of Nazi era artworks. For example, countries such as Germa-
ny, Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic, France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom set up important provenance research 
programs to screen their national collections for Nazi loot.289 Similar to 
the United States Nazi-Era Provenance Internet Portal (“NEPIP”), the 
results of the screening are often centralized in an online database.290 
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However, in some countries, such as Switzerland, the provenance screen-
ing has not yet been finalized.291 These provenance screenings should not 
be overvalued, as often the research initiative was already taken before 
the 1998 Washington Conference.292 For most Western European coun-
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Sept. 28, 2011) (Switz.). The document includes a summary of a survey of Swiss muse-
ums on the state of provenance research. See FED. DEP’T OF HOME AFFAIRS & FED. DEP’T 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE STATE OF WORK ON NAZI-LOOTED ART, IN 
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ble at http://www.lootedart.com/web_images/pdf/BerichtEDI-
EDA_zum_Stand_der_Arbeiten_im_NS-Raubkunstbereich_e_140111.pdf. The report 
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make its results available. See id.; Thomas Stephens, Swiss Want Clearer Picture of 
Looted Nazi Art, SWISSINFO.CH (Jan. 20, 2011, 8:28 AM), 
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tries, the Washington Principles only boosted then-existing projects of 
provenance research. 
However, more important to this Article’s thesis are the developments 
regarding the actual settlement of Holocaust-related claims. Considering 
the United States’ paltry restitution achievements, the nation can no 
longer justifiably claim to be among the leaders in the restitution move-
ment, as certain European countries—such as France, the United King-
dom, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany—established various effec-
tive alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for resolving ownership 
issues. 
In September 1999, France created the Commission pour 
l’indemnisation des victimes de spoliations intervenues du fait des lé-
gislations antisémites en vigueur pendant l’Occupation (“CIVS”), a non-
adversarial disputes resolution body to address all kinds of claims for 
financial or material spoliation, including artworks and collectibles.293 
CIVS operates outside the court system. Hence, its assessment is not lim-
ited to mere legal grounds and it may seek solutions where strictly speak-
ing court actions are time-barred.294 The authority to grant compensation 
by the state rests with the Prime Minister295 as CIVS only makes non-
binding recommendations.296 Nevertheless, in October 2006, all CIVS 
recommendations had been implemented in spite of their nonbinding na-
ture.297 
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The United Kingdom similarly instated means to facilitate restitution. 
Its Spoliation Advisory Panel was established in 2000298 as an alternative 
to litigation. The panel resolves claims from victims of Nazi-looting, 
whose artwork is currently in the possession of a United Kingdom na-
tional collection or held in another United Kingdom museum or gallery 
established for public benefit.299 The panel may also advise the claimant 
and the institution about claims for items in private collections at the 
joint request of the claimant and the owner.300 Similar to its French coun-
terpart, the panel considers both legal and non-legal obligations, such as 
the moral strength of the claimant’s case and the moral obligation that 
may rest on the holding institution.301 In addition, the Spoliation Adviso-
ry Panel’s recommendations are also not legally binding on any party.302 
Nevertheless, if a claimant accepts the panel’s recommendation, the 
claim is considered fully and finally settled as soon as the recommenda-
tion is implemented.303 
In order to deal with claims for Nazi-looted art, the Dutch Ministry for 
Education, Culture, and Science took action on November 16, 2001, by 
calling into existence the “Advisory Committee on the Assessment of 
Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second 
World War” (“Restitutions Committee”).304 The Restitutions Commit-
tee’s mission is twofold. First, it provides advice to the State Secretary 
for Culture regarding claims for restitution of Nazi-looted cultural assets 
from state controlled collections.305 Although the Committee’s recom-
mendations are nonbinding, in practice the State Secretary has always 
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acted upon them.306 Second, it may also settle disputes concerning looted 
artwork that is not held by the Dutch state where the parties involved 
agree to bring the case before the Committee.307 Up until December 31, 
2010, a total of 122 claims for restitution were filed and 94 recommenda-
tions were made.308 
The Dutch Restitutions Committee bears a strong resemblance to the 
Austrian dispute resolution mechanism. In Austria, the 1998 Art Restitu-
tion Act309 and the 1999 Vienna Council Resolution on Art Restitution310 
regulate the conditions and procedure for the return of Nazi era looted 
artwork from public collections of the Republic of Austria and the City 
of Vienna to the original owners or their rightful heirs. The decision to 
restitute a certain object is made by the Federal Minister for Education, 
Arts and Culture,311 acting upon the basis of the findings of the Kommis-
sion für Provenienzforschung (Commission for Provenance Research)312 
and the recommendation of the Beirat (Advisory Board).313 Although 
they are nonbinding, historically all ministerial decisions concurred with 
the Beitat’s recommendations, which can be consulted online.314 “In Vi-
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enna, the functions of the Advisory Board and Commission for Prove-
nance Research are performed by the Wiener Rückstellungskommission 
(Viennese Commission for Restitution), which can recommend to the 
executive city councilor that a specific object be returned.”315 Since the 
enactment of the Art Restitution Act, the Republic of Austria has resti-
tuted around 10,000 art objects.316 According to the 2009 report, the City 
of Vienna itself restituted more than five-thousand objects.317 
Finally, the German situation naturally differs from the above. In re-
sponse to the Washington Conference, the German federal, regional, and 
local authorities adopted the Gemeinsame Erklärung (Common Declara-
tion) regarding the restitution of Nazi-looted art on December 9, 1999.318 
According to Section I of the Gemeinsame Erklärung, the aforemen-
tioned authorities pledged to “bring their influence to bear in the” man-
aging bodies of the public cultural institutions so as to enable the restitu-
tion of Nazi-confiscated artworks to the wartime owners or their heirs.319 
Section III embodies a crucial element of the Gemeinsame Erklärung, as 
it obliges the cultural institutions to fully disclose the results of the prov-
enance research regarding their collection.320 In order to implement Sec-
tion III, the Koordinierungsstelle für Kulturgutverluste (Coordination 
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Office for Lost Cultural Objects) was established and publishes prove-
nance information on the Internet.321 
Besides documenting and publicizing the problem of Nazi-looted art, 
the Koordinierungsstelle acts as the administrative office of the 
Beratende Kommission im Zusammenhang mit der Rückgabe NS-
verfolgungsbedingt entzogener Kulturguts, insbesondere aus jüdischem 
Besitz (Advisory Commission in Connection with the Return of Cultural 
Property Seized, Primarily from Jewish Property, as a Result of Nazi 
Persecution, referred to as “the Advisory Commission”).322 The Advisory 
Commission was set up in 2003 and can be appealed to for disputes re-
garding the return of Nazi-looted art objects from the German museums, 
libraries, archives, or other public institutions.323 The Advisory Commis-
sion serves as a mediator between representatives of the collections and 
former owners or their heirs.324 Again, the Advisory Commission’s rec-
ommendations are legally nonbinding.325 In order to assist the cultural 
institutions in identifying Nazi-looted artworks in their collections and to 
provide guidance on dealing with claims, a set of implementary guide-
lines, the so-called Handreichung, was drawn up in February 2001 under 
the supervision of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture 
and the Media.326 As of this writing, the Advisory Commission issued 
four opinions, three of which recommended the return of, or compensa-
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tion for the loss of, artwork.327 However, this apparently limited number 
misrepresents Germany’s actual restitutional efforts. Indeed, countless 
art objects have been restituted from German public collections without 
the involvement of the Advisory Commission.328 After all, the Commis-
sion may only serve as a mediator at the joint request of both the muse-
um and the claimant,329 who often avoids submitting the request to the 
Commission,330 or does not feel the need to do so, given the voluntary 
cooperation of the museum. 
It is crucial to realize that, if not for the above alternative mechanisms 
of dispute resolution, virtually all Holocaust-related art claims would be 
dismissed in court, given the strong protection European civil law awards 
to a bonafide purchaser’s title. Indeed, unlike in the United States, ac-
tions in replevin or conversion regarding wartime stolen objects are long 
time-barred due to the lack of any mechanisms to postpone accrual in 
continental European property law, such as the widespread discovery 
rule or the New York demand and refusal rule.331 Accordingly, in the 
above countries, restitution claims for works in the nations’ leading mu-
seums are assessed on their merits, exclusively considering the circum-
stances under which the loss occurred, while disregarding technical de-
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fenses that would deny the victims their day in court.332 In addition, with 
respect to the responsibility they assumed under the Washington Confer-
ence to resolve Nazi era claims in a fair and just manner, Austria, Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all established a 
permanent neutral advisory body to assist in addressing ownership is-
sues.333 This differs from the ad hoc advisory commission established in 
Belgium334 and the absence of any such commission in the United States, 
where parties are obliged to resort to litigation.335 
Finally, it is crucial to understand that the creation of these alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms have not opened the feared “flood-
gates”336 of litigation or instigated the closure of entire museums as a 
result of overindulgent, quasi-automatic restitutions.337 In fact, even be-
fore these neutral advisory bodies, restitution claims are frequently dis-
missed, albeit on substantive grounds, as the following few examples 
will demonstrate. 
Indeed, on June 12, 2008, the German Advisory Commission recom-
mended against the return of Hans Sachs’ looted poster collection, in-
cluding valuable works by Mucha, Kandinsky, Toulouse-Lautrec, and 
Bernhard, from the Deutsches Historisches Museum (German Historical 
Museum).338 The Commission took into account the fact that Sachs him-
self always considered his material claims to be settled in view of a 1961 
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compensation award of 225,000 DM, an amount several independent 
experts called “extremely respectable.”339 In addition, the commission 
observed that Sachs had always considered his activities as a collector to 
be a public service.340 Displeased with the outcome, Sachs’ heir refused 
to accept the Commission’s decision and commenced legal proceedings. 
However, on February 18, 2010, the Berlin Kammergericht found that 
the posters were to stay on display at the museum, thereby overruling the 
decision of the Berlin Landgericht of February 10, 2009.341 
The Spoliation Advisory Panel’s decision in the Glaser case is a se-
cond interesting example. On June 24, 2009, only days before the United 
Kingdom signed the Terezín Declaration, the panel advised against resti-
tution of eight drawings held by the Courtauld Institute of Art in Lon-
don.342 Nevertheless, it was generally accepted that the drawings had 
once belonged to Professor Glaser, the Jewish director of the Berlin State 
Art Library, who was forced to resign from his position and flee the 
country shortly after Hitler’s ascension to Chancellor.343 The panel, how-
ever, found “that Glaser’s decision to sell the bulk of his collection and 
leave Germany stemmed from mixed motives.”344 In addition, according 
to the panel, the prices paid for “the drawings at second auction were 
reasonable market prices . . . and were not depressed by circumstances 
attributable to the Nazi regime.”345 Accordingly, the panel concluded that 
the Glaser heirs’ claims to the drawings were “insufficiently strong to 
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warrant a recommendation that the drawings should be transferred to 
them.”346 
Similarly, on December 15, 2010, the Spoliation Advisory Panel ad-
vised against the restitution of a Rubens oil sketch to the heirs of the 
Gutmann family. It concluded that, while there was some evidence that 
Gutmann suffered from “anti-semitic persecution under the Nazi regime, 
. . . [it] was only a subsidiary and causally insignificant factor in his deci-
sion to sell his [artwork].”347 After all, the Panel found that Gutmann sold 
The Coronation of the Virgin at a price “consistent with the market val-
ue” and principally in order to pay debts resulting from investments in-
curred before the Nazis came to power.348 
Finally, in its 2009 report, the Dutch Restitutions Committee pointed 
out that in 24 of 80 recommendations issued since 2002, the Committee 
recommended that the claim be rejected in full.349 Similarly, with regard 
to the Austria situation, it was reported that in 26 out of 210 dossiers, the 
Beirat recommended not to return the objects at hand.350 
Although the recommendations of the restitution commissions are 
sometimes controversial due to the uncertainty about the underlying 
facts, the above countries’ claims are at least reviewed on the merits. 
This undeniably differs from the United States’ approach, where legal 
actions in replevin or conversion are often dismissed based upon the 
technical defenses of statutes of limitations and laches, which are an in-
extricable part of day-to-day property litigation. As the Nazi-victims’ 
claims stem from decades-old looting, it is evident that even under the 
more owner-friendly common law, the cards are easily stacked against 
those bringing a claim. By raising statute of limitations and laches de-
fenses or even filing declaratory judgment actions, U.S. collectors often 
make the most of their chances to escape court ordered restitutions. 
It is illogical that these institutions can deprive undisputed victims of 
wartime looting, who never received any compensation, from the stolen 
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possessions which they have at long last retraced, by raising technical 
defenses to blame them for not filing suit earlier. Although legally sound, 
is it not somewhat perverse reasoning that the leading U.S. museums 
think themselves not to be bound by the Washington Principles, Vilnius, 
and Terezín agreements the Executive Branch entered into, especially 
taking into consideration the museums’ moral obligation under the self-
imposed AAM guidelines? Is it not inconsistent for the United States to 
urge its museums to conduct provenance research, in the knowledge that 
it is beyond its power to procure actual restitution of looted objects? It is 
disconcerting that the United States demands restitution in other coun-
tries but is indulgent towards its own hesitations. After all, the purport of 
the United States’ own commitment to effect restitution of looted art 
from U.S. collections is almost insignificant, particularly given the pri-
vate status of the nation’s leading museums. Above all, if the federal 
government’s scope in resolving restitution claims is as inappreciable as 
Ambassador Kennedy observed in his 2007 Potsdam speech,351 and the 
federal government truly lacks the power to impose a restitution policy 
on the nation’s museums or to establish a neutral expert advisory body to 
settle Nazi era art claims on their merits, how can the public accept the 
federal court’s decision that a state’s elimination of the statutory limita-
tion in favor of Holocaust victims infringes on the federal government’s 
exclusive foreign affairs power to make and resolve war?352 The United 
States must be honest about its restitution intentions on the international 
front. Either the federal level should change its response to the Terezín 
Declaration, or the states should take action to ensure that Holocaust-
related restitution claims be decided on their merits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article analyzes the impact of the 2009 Terezín Declaration on 
Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues and its predecessors on the set-
tlement of Holocaust-related title disputes. It also commented on the 
sharp divide between moral obligations and legal duties with regard to 
restitution matters. Taking into account the participation of both the 
United States and the majority of European countries in these interna-
tional declarations on Nazi era art spoliation, the Article compares the 
United States’ response to the international framework with the hetero-
geneous implementation on the European Continent. 
As a manifestation of the post-Cold War revival of the general debate 
on wartime spoliations, the remarkable upsurge in Holocaust-related title 
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disputes over the past fifteen years caused the international community to 
acknowledge the outstanding injustices of WWII through concerted in-
ternational action. Accordingly, since the 1998 Washington Conference 
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art, a chain of public law instruments 
has been adopted in order to come to terms with the enduring suffering 
of the victims of Nazi-art persecution. However, neither the Terezín Dec-
laration nor its predecessors qualifies as an international treaty, as the 
signatories’ will to be bound and compelled to them was nonexistent. 
Accordingly, in spite of the rhetoric that typically comes with Holocaust-
related initiatives, these non-self-executing international agreements did 
not impose any enforceable legal duty on the government of the signato-
ry states, let alone any additional legal right for the victims of Nazi era 
spoliation. 
Despite nonbinding international agreements’ potential invocation of 
social pressure spurring legal compliance, this Article demonstrates the 
tenuousness of arguments drawn upon public international law in actual-
ly obtaining restitution of looted artwork from U.S. museum collections. 
Indeed, as far as the actual settlement of Holocaust-related art disputes in 
the United States is concerned, the above international agreements’ ob-
jectives have, for the greater part, not even been indirectly met due to 
their reticent implementation in domestic law and the private status of 
the leading American art museums. 
However, the primary purpose of this Article is to expose the disparity 
of the American policy towards art restitution. After all, despite the Unit-
ed States’ failure to implement the body of non-self-executing agree-
ments concerning Nazi-looted art, the country continuously proclaims to 
support restitution efforts in compliance with its international obliga-
tions. Moreover, the United States repeatedly criticizes the European ret-
icence regarding the restitution of stolen artworks in general, and its non-
compliance with the spirit of the Washington Principles in particular. 
Through comparative analysis of the international agreements’ heteroge-
neous implementation on the European Continent, the Article reveals that 
the United States’ criticism of the European position is not only unfitting 
given its own legal imperfections with respect to Nazi-looted art, but also 
inaccurate taking into account the serious restitutional efforts displayed 
in a number of Western European countries. Indeed, unlike Southern and 
Eastern European countries, states—such as France, the United King-
dom, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands—pay significantly better 
heed to the international agenda by establishing alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms for resolving Nazi-looted art claims on the merits. 
In that respect, it should be recalled that hundreds of objects were resti-
tuted from the Dutch national collections to the heirs of the original own-
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ers, while Austria alone restituted around 10,000 art objects.353 These 
figures contrast sharply with those in the United States. It is striking that, 
according to the May 2007 AAMD Position Paper on Art Museums and 
Identification and the Restitution of Works Stolen by the Nazis: 
[B]etween 1998 and July 2006 twenty-two works in American museum 
collections have been identified as having been stolen by the Nazis and 
not properly restituted after the war. In each of these cases, the works 
have been restituted to the heirs of Holocaust victims or settlements 
have been reached with the heirs to graciously allow the works to re-
main in museums for the public’s benefit.354 
Twenty-two works—out of more than eighteen million objects held by 
American art museums in public trust355 and more than 25,000 works 
identified as having changed hands in Continental Europe during the Na-
zi era356—is a distressing number. The better part of these twenty-two 
voluntary restitutions occurred in the early days of the art spoliation de-
bate’s revival, when emotionality and perceived social pressure arguably 
motivated discomfited museum directors to concede, often acting simply 
to soothe public opinion. In 2000, for instance, the Philadelphia Museum 
agreed to return five looted pieces of armor to the Dresden Museum.357 
Later that year, the Denver Art Museum voluntarily returned a painting 
by a follower of Gerard ter Borch to the daughter of a Jewish banker, 
who was forced to sell his collection during WWII.358 Around the same 
time, the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., voluntarily resti-
tuted Still Life with Fruit and Game by the Flemish artist Frans Snyders 
to the heirs of a French Jewish collector, Edgar Stern.359 A final example 
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was the sensational dispute Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum.360 In this 
case, the heirs of Paul Rosenberg, a French wartime art dealer, tried to 
recover L’Odalisque, a looted Matisse painting they came across in the 
collection of the Seattle Art Museum.361 Until its private settlement, the 
case was fought before the Washington District Court.362 Eventually, the 
museum agreed to return the painting, when its own research substantiat-
ed the claim of the Rosenberg heirs.363 
The museums’ respect, openness, and obligingness was, in the early 
days, often greeted with gratitude and resulted in favorable settlements. 
Often, in exchange for recognition and/or some minor financial compen-
sation, the work could remain on display. In 2001, for example, a settle-
ment agreement led to the gift of Le Grand Pont, a Gustave Courbet 
painting, to the Yale University Art Gallery and its temporary return to 
the Weinmann family on ten-year loan.364 Another important resolved 
dispute concerned Lucas Cranach’s Madonna and Child in a Landscape, 
which was donated to the Museum of Art in Raleigh, North Carolina, in 
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1984.365 In return for a pledge to use the painting to instruct the public on 
the horrors of the Holocaust art looting, the museum could retain owner-
ship upon payment of a much reduced price.366 In yet another case, the 
Art Institute of Chicago reached a settlement with the heirs of Federico 
Gentili di Giuseppe, an Italian-Jewish collector living in France, whose 
entire collection had been auctioned off illicitly by the French govern-
ment in 1941.367 By recognizing the family’s ownership over the sculp-
ture, the Art Institute was able to retain the work through part-purchase 
and part-donation.368 
Despite these favorable settlements, in less than a decade, U.S. muse-
ums shied from restitutional efforts, arguing statute of limitations defens-
es, and resorted to declaratory judgment actions. As such, the United 
States shifted away from the spirit of 1998 Washington Principles. Un-
fortunately, although international framework on the matter is wide-
spread and readily invoked in Nazi era art disputes, most signatory coun-
tries—including the United States—ignore their international commit-
ments. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that, the purport of the 1998 
Washington Principles and its predecessors is sufficiently clear to all sig-
natory countries. Accordingly, there is no need for additional elaborate, 
yet nonbinding, declarations regarding Nazi era art looting. After all, if 
the implementation of the existing international framework has not made 
significant headway in many jurisdictions, any future attempt to bring 
about an international restitution consensus, turning moral obligations 
into legal duties, will be stillborn. The only way for the international 
community to achieve the spirit of the Washington Principles is to broad-
ly implement the existing framework, not to add yet another nonbinding 
recital of good intentions.369 Therefore, let’s not talk about the Terezín 
Declaration because, unlike what happened in the Nazi era ghetto, the 
2009 Terezín events can be forgotten. 
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